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International Tax Reform Should Begin
at Home: Replace the Corporate




The present U.S. system of international taxation is riddled with
problems because it does not satisfy critical principles of
economics, justice, or common sense. It fails to accomplish the
most important goals that an international system should
achieve-that is, protecting the domestic tax base in a way that
fosters domestic economic development and the creation ofjobs.
This paper explores alternatives to the present system to see if
they do a better job. Some of the alternatives fail for the same
reasons as the present system because they are predicated on the
same outmoded theories. Some are clearly an improvement, but
at the same time raise other significant issues. There is one
system, however, that consistently overcomes these defects in a
way that would promote domestic business activity and job
growth. That system is a destination-based, territorial
consumption tax for all corporations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Every nation faces the same problem. Economic forces unleashed by
free trade, open capital markets, and the enhanced mobility of many of the
factors of production, have led to intense tax competition among nations
and, as a result, have tested nations' ability to tax business income. The
common principles of international taxation, derived one hundred years ago
in simpler times, are inadequate to overcome the challenges brought about
by dramatic changes in world production and consumption. The United
States hangs on to an illusive principle of residence taxation of business
income through a hodgepodge of complex, conflicting approaches-
deferral of business and equity capital income (territorial approach), anti-
avoidance provisions (residence approach), and a liberal foreign tax credit
system (residual residence approach). Though the U.S. system is nominally
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of Pennsylvania State University.
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a residence system, it is in fact a hybrid; it hardly taxes the foreign business
income of corporations, and it regularly results in the under-assessment of
the U.S. business income of both U.S. and foreign-owned enterprises.
International tax rules must reflect the world in which multinationals
produce goods and services both within and without the borders of their
"own" country for sale to customers both within and without their "own"
country.I To get a sense of corporate dominance of trade, U.S.
multinationals and their foreign affiliates accounted for 57% of total U.S.
exports and 37% of U.S. imports in 2003.2 Forty-one percent of
multinational exports were to foreign affiliates, 44% of imports were from
related affiliates.3 Only a small part of U.S. owned foreign affiliates'
activities are involved with U.S. imports; 11% of sales of U.S. foreign
affiliates are imports into the United States.
The picture would be incomplete, however, without considering the
role of foreign-owned U.S. affiliates. In recent years, foreign multinationals
and their U.S. affiliates accounted for 20% of total U.S. exports and 30% of
U.S. imports.4 The majority of this trade involved intercompany trade,
approximately 50% of exports and 80% of imports.5
The U.S. tax system is designed to tax the income from exports as they
leave the United States, but to exempt the income from imports when they
come in. Sales by U.S. domestic corporations are included in income,
purchases from foreign affiliates are deductible, and those foreign affiliates'
income is deferred until repatriation as a dividend to the United States.
This is the same pattern for foreign-owned multinationals and their U.S.
affiliates. U.S. affiliates are treated as U.S. corporations; foreign parents
are non-resident entities taxed only on the basis of U.S. source income.
Globalization and tax competition have placed intense pressure on the
present U.S. international tax system's "ability to apply transaction-based
tax and intercompany transfer pricing rules to a range of common
transactions."' For many years, Congress has been content with
incremental change. Congress sometimes patches the existing system in
1 See discussion infra accompanying notes 52-54 for a discussion of the problems of
conceptualizing the residence of a firm that is engaged in business in many countries.
2 Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., U.S. Multinational Corporations: Operations in 2003, DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, July 2005, at 9, 9-10.
Bureau for Workers' Activities, Int'l Labour Org., Multinational Corporations (1995),
http://actiav.itcilo.org/action-english/teleam/globalilo/multinat/ multinat.htm.
4 William J. Zeile, US. Affiliates ofForeign Companies: Operations in 2003, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Aug. 2005, at 208.
5 Id.
6 See I.R.C. § 861 (2006) (resident companies), I.R.C. § 871 (2006) (nonresident
companies engaged in a trade or business with the United States).
American Bar Association Section on Taxation, Report of the Task Force on
International Tax Reform, 59 TAx LAW. 649, 658 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Task Force
Report].
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order to close loopholes and raise additional revenue. Other times,
Congress elevates the tax expenditure function over the tax revenue
function and increases the tax benefits for overseas operations.8 The result
is a system that raises little revenue from foreign operations and sometimes
reduces substantially the domestic tax base.9
Over the years, there have been many proposals for significant change
to the international tax system. One proposal would end the deferral of the
tax obligation for the foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations.' 0 A second
proposal would exempt foreign active business income of U.S. taxpayers."
A third proposal would exempt foreign economic rents.12 A fourth would
adopt a territorial allocation of worldwide income based on formulary
apportionment.' 3 At the same time, there has been considerable discussion
that targets the overhaul of our entire income tax system by replacing it
with a consumption tax model.14  This paper seeks to examine those
international tax reform proposals in terms of several types of inquiry. The
first is the need to evaluate tax systems in terms of the societal goals and
optimum conditions for appropriate, successful taxation. The second is the
need to face the lessons from experience that have identified the principal
problems in international taxation. The third is the need to determine why
the present system, which is the product of a hundred years of intense self-
examination, still does not work well. Finally is the need to test reform
proposals against these factors to see if any present a superior solution. The
object is to reach some conclusions on the efficacy of both income tax
solutions and consumption tax solutions in providing international tax
solutions. 15
See, e.g., American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418
(2004). For further discussion see text infra accompanying notes 41-47.
9 See Zeile, supra note 4, at 692-716 (reviewing the present state of U.S. international tax
law).
1o See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX
REv. 299 (2001).
" See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAx SYSTEM 103 (2005) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY PANEL].
12 See William B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, Tax
Sparing and Development: It Is All About Source!, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 349 (2007).
13 See, e.g., Joan M. Weiner, Using the Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues
in Implementing Formula Apportionment at the International Level (U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
OTA Paper 83, 1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ota83.
pdf.
14 See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986); William D.
Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113
(1974).
15 Only reforms that the U.S. could practically adopt unilaterally will be analyzed.
Formulary apportionment will not be addressed since practical implementation requires a
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TAX
PROVISIONS
International taxation must deal with a complex situation. It involves
the power of nation states to assess and tax economic events that have direct
consequences outside the nation's borders. By the time income taxation
became an important tax for most countries in the early twentieth century,
there were two distinct approaches to international taxation. The first, and
clearly the dominant approach, was source or territorial taxation. The
second, adopted principally by the United States and the United Kingdom,
was residence or domiciliary taxation.' 6
Source tax is based on the proposition that a country has the right to
tax income that has "arisen" in that country.' 7 It links taxation with power
over the subject matter of the tax. It is a direct method of assigning a tax
base to a nation. Practically, it must draw lines between those transactions
and economic events that occur in a country and those that do not. It relies
on its ability to place income and expenditures based on factors happening
in that country. Its premise is that income so sourced belongs to a particular
country. In principle, once a source system determines its appropriate tax
base, it freely taxes it according to its own principles without concern as to
any other country's tax regime.
Residence taxation is an indirect method of assigning a tax base to a
nation.18 Initially, it ignores the focus of the activity or factors that give rise
to the income; instead, it looks to the person or entity that earns the
income-that is, the taxpayer. Thus, residence taxation is a personal
jurisdiction approach; a nation seeks to tax its residents on income
irrespective of source. The personal relationship between nation and
resident gives that nation the right and the power to tax that person on her
worldwide income.
Unlike source taxation, resident taxation must directly confront the
problem of international double taxation. There are two generally accepted
models for mitilating double taxation: the exemption and the foreign tax
credit approach. The exemption system is not truly a residence-based
approach because it removes foreign income from the tax base. It can be
justified in a residence system as a practical measure where there is reason
to believe that the incidence of foreign tax is almost the same or higher than
high degree of international coordination. See Weiner, supra note 13.
6 See generally William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax
Competition: Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 161, 180 (2002);
Michael J. Graetz, & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International
Taxation, 46 DuKE L.J. 1021, 1050 (1997).
17 Barker, supra note 16, at 181.
18 id.
19 See Articles of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 23
(2003).
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that found in the residence state. The second method, the foreign tax credit,
permits a credit for foreign taxes as an offset to the residence country tax.20
Tax credit systems limit the credit to the amount of domestic tax that would
otherwise be due.21 Thus, worldwide tax coupled with the credit allows the
source country the primary position of taxation while granting the residence
country the residual tax, if any.
The present U.S. system contains a further distinction concerning
income earned by a corporation. A resident corporation is taxed on its
worldwide income.22 Foreign corporations, including those owned by a
resident, are taxed, if at all, only on income connected with the United
States. Owner-residents of foreign corporations are taxed on sales of their
shares and on dividends. In general, income earned by U.S. owned foreign
corporations is deferred until repatriation.23 Corporate owners are entitled
to an indirect foreign tax credit on taxable foreign dividends with regard to
the underlying tax on the foreign corporation's earnings.24 Deferral of
controlled foreign corporation income reduces the present value of the
residual tax to the United States.25
III. THE GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM
Clear consensus on the goals of the U.S. tax system must be the
starting point for successful reform. The first and most obvious function of
taxation is raising revenue. 26 Today, with the ever-increasing problem of
tax competition, governments are looking for new, dependable sources of
revenue.28
More effective taxation internationally is primarily a question of the
tax base. 29 There are three inter-related aspects or perspectives on the tax
20 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 901 (2006) (allowing a credit against U.S. tax for income taxes paid
to a foreign government).
21 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 904 (2006) (limiting the amount of the foreign tax credit to the
amount of U.S. tax due on the foreign income).
22 See I.R.C. § 11 (2006). See generally PAUL R. MCDANIEL, HUGH J. AULT, & JAMES R.
REPETTI, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 35-56 (5th ed. 2005).
23 The exception to this rule is for certain income earned by Controlled Foreign
Corporations (Subpart F). I.R.C. § 951 (2006).
24 I.R.C. § 902 (2006).
25 See infra note 65.
26 Adam Smith was the first to recognize that taxation should be the primary method
governments use to raise revenue for their operations. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS, bk. 5, ch. 2, pt. 1 (1904).
27 See Barker, supra note 16, at 165-71.
28 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 654. A 2006 American Bar Association Task
Force recognized that the American Job Creation Act of 2004 continued a trend of lower
taxes on business income. Id. Even this study suggested that the U.S. needed a new direction
that required a more effective and intensive taxation of foreign income. Id. at 674-76.
29 Additional revenue is also raised where the economy generates additions to the tax
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base. First is the U.S. domestic source tax base for all corporations, U.S.
and foreign. Second is the foreign source tax base for U.S. residents. The
third is the foreign source tax base for non-resident corporations owned by
U.S. residents. The first base targets effective territorial taxation of
business enterprises. The second and third bases target effective
extraterritorial taxation of the income of our resident companies.
While the second and third goals may be appropriate objectives of
policy in some situations, the primary goal of international tax rules and
their reform must be the first concern. Unless the principles of fair and
efficient taxation for domestic activities and foreign activities were one and
the same, which they are not, the inescapable conclusion is that the primary
focus should be on establishing and protecting the domestic tax base from
erosion that is caused by mischaracterizing and misvaluing foreign and
domestic income.30 A critical reason behind the international trend toward
the alternative of a foreign business income (territorial) exemption system
is that territorial exemption is perceived to be a more effective way of
identifying and preserving the domestic tax base. 31 Economic projections,
to the effect that an exemption system is expected to substantially raise
revenue as compared to present law, seem to confirm this. 32 The apparent
reason for the increase in projected revenue from a system that exempts
business income is the more effective taxation of capital income to resident
33taxpayers.
Tax reform must also confront the real tax system, which is grounded
in the dynamic process of politics. "Governments have long recognized the
vast power of tax law to influence human conduct. Tax law has taken an
interventionist approach, using the structure of taxation to achieve social
goals outside the inherent policy choices of taxation. ... The aims and
purposes of taxation include the purposeful use of the forms of taxation to
promote economic and social results that are deemed to be politically
base.
30 See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 659 ("While changes to international tax
rules generally have not been a source of revenue, changes that redress incursions into the
U.S. tax base would indeed raise revenue.").
31 Until quite recently, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States were the
principal nations which still adopted a worldwide tax regime for corporations. See U.S.
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-934, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: STUDY
COUNTRIES THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN-SOURCED INCOME FACE COMPLIANCE RISKS AND
BURDENS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2009). Both Japan and the United
Kingdom have now adopted provisions for the exemption of foreign active business income.
Id. at 37.
32 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 658 n.17 (noting that dividend exception has
been estimated by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation to increase revenue by $54.8
billion over a 10-year period).
Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Where Will They Go if We Go Territorial?
Dividend Exemption and the Location Decisions of U.S. Multinational Corporations, 54
NAT'L TAX J. 787, 798 (2001).
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desirable." 34  There is obviously a direct relation between the foreign
operations of U.S. taxpayers and their domestic operations. Some have
argued that increased foreign investment can have a beneficial impact on
growth and domestic production. 35  The evidence is sketchy for this
proposition; there are many reasons for foreign activities that promote
offsetting results. 36  Foreign activities relating to intra-firm exports do
promote domestic production. Multinationals also expand foreign
operations to reallocate production to foreign locations thus replacing U.S.
jobs. However these tradeoffs are assessed, studies show that low foreign
taxes and tax preferences can significantly effect locational decisions.
Enacting tax preferences to increase the benefit of domestic over
foreign production can also be Troblematic. The purpose of the American
Jobs Creation Act ("AJCA") was to promote domestic welfare and
domestic job growth. The AJCA provided a temporary tax deduction for
U.S. corporations repatriating cash dividends. Evidence suggests that it was
a tremendous success in promoting the repatriation of approximately $300
billion in dividends. 4 0 But evidence also shows that the extra cash primaril
was used for acquisitions and additional management compensation.
Dividend flows to the United States were dramatically curtailed
34 William B. Barker, The Concept Of Tax: A Normative Approach, in THE CONCEPT OF
TAX, 21, 27-28 (Bruno Peeters et al. eds., 2005).
3 See generally Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, Domestic Effects of the
Foreign Activities of U.S. Multinationals (Ross Sch. of Bus. Paper No. 1020, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=825264 (estimating that
10% greater foreign investment is associated with 2.6% greater domestic investment, and
10% greater foreign employee compensation is associated with 3.7% greater domestic
employee compensation).
36 See Martin A. Sullivan, Will Obama's International Proposals Kill U.S. Jobs?, 123
TAX NOTES 1063, 1064 (2009) (arguing that the positive effect of foreign investment on U.S.
activity reported in the Desai-Foley-Hines study is overstated due to statistical bias).
3 For an account of tax's effect on jobs, see Francesco Daveri & Guido Tabellini,
Unemployment Growth and Taxation in Industrial Countries, 15 EcON. POL'Y 48, 52 (2000)
(concluding that about 4% points out of 10.5% unemployment was attributable to the large
incidence of the tax on labor).
38 See Harry Grubert, Intangible Income, Intercompany Transactions, Income Shifting,
and the Choice ofLocation, 56 NAT'L TAx J. 221, 221-24 (2003); James R. Hines, Jr. & Eric
M. Rice, Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business, 109 Q. J. ECON. 149
(1994).
3 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, supra note 8.
40 See Melissa Redmiles, The One Time Received Dividend Deduction, IRS STATISTICS
OF INCOME BULLETIN, Spring 2008, at 102, 103, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/08codivdeductbul.pdf.
41 Jennifer L. Blouin & Linda K. Krull, Bringing It Home: A Study of the Incentives
Surrounding the Repatriation ofForeign Earnings Under the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, 47 J. ACCT. REs. 1027 (2009) (stock repurchase); Thomas J. Brennan, Cash-Flow and
Market Response to Repatriation 24 (May 24, 2008), http://ssm.com/abstract- 1134040 (cash
may have been used for other purposes).
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immediately after the sunset of the provision, with the result that net
repatriations were substantially negative over a four-year period.42
Experiments with tax incentives rarely achieve goals worth their costs. 43
The consequence of granting tax incentives in this case was substantial
revenue loss without any appreciable increase in U.S. investment."
It is often hard to predict exactly what effect a tax incentive will have.
Tax systems do things differently and tax incentives can have quite
different effects on economic activity. Consideration instead should be
given to systemic provisions rather than to piecemeal incentive provisions
which have the capacity to promote the objectives of welfare in an even-
handed manner. Systemic tax reform must speak in terms of those
economic conditions that promote fair and efficient taxation.
IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS (OR ASPIRATIONS)
FOR OPTIMAL TAXATION
Neither tax systems nor tax reform can accomplish the goals of
taxation without addressing certain important elements of good taxation.
These elements are efficiency, fairness, and ability to administrate. These
elements, moreover, take on quite different aspects when one considers how
an open international system bears on the efficacy of taxation.
A. Efficiency
The ideal of taxation begins with the approach of positive economics
where the most normative prescription for tax is that of efficiency. Tax
should be imposed so as to minimize the social costs inherent in collection
and spending. In general, an efficient tax is a neutral tax-that is, the
incidence of the tax should not change the relative prices of goods and
services in the public sector. Taxes are considered to be efficient if
resources are used in a way that maximizes their output.45
A tax can be inefficient when its incidence distorts economic decision-
making from a tract that would have been followed in the absence of tax.46
This ideal of efficiency is linked to a general goal that is variously
described as the maximization of total wealth, or the maximization of total
42 Thomas J. Brennan, What Happens After a Holiday?: Long-Term Effects of the
Repatriation Provision ofthe AJCA, 5 Nw. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 1, 2, 16-17 (2010).
43 See G.A. MACKENZIE, DAVID W.H. ORSMOND & PHILLIP R. GERSON, THE
COMPOSITION OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AND GROWTH: LESSONS FROM FISCAL REFORMS IN
EIGHT ECONOMIES 8 (IMF Occasional Paper No. 149, 1997) (recounting the experience of
emerging economies with tax incentives).
4 Brennan, supra note 42, at 17.
45 Norman B. Ture, Taxing Foreign-Source Income, in U.S. TAXATION OF AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD 37,38 (AEI-Hoover Policy Study 16, 1975).
46 See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 193 (Jack R. Crutchfield ed., 1973).
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wealth or utility. 47 Thus, the government should design its tax laws and
institutions in a way that promotes this condition.
In the international setting, the problem of neutrality takes on a unique
aspect. Tax rules or regimes are not neutral where tax rules or regimes
affect locational decisions.4 8 Tax incidence is an important factor in
determining the location of an enterprise or investment any time when
factors of production are mobile. Such mobile factors include moneyed
capital-both tangible assets and intangible assets like technologies and
trademarks. It also can include labor, especially in the case of highly
skilled labor. The importance of tax to locational decisions is well-
documented. 49 Nations compete in many ways to attract value producing
activities to their countries. Tax incentives are oftentimes their principle
enticement. Targeted tax incentives are not neutral and are inefficient.
1. Capital Export Neutrality and Capital Import Neutrality
Taxation faces unique problems of efficiency and neutrality in open
settings where production and values flow freely and each nation is free to
set its own rules. Traditionally, the debate over principles of efficiency has
been structured in terms of the principle that international tax law should
result in the efficient allocation of capital.so Neutral taxation of business
income has been subsumed under the principles of capital income taxation.
Two approaches to neutrality still form the basis of the debate today.
These are Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) and Capital Import Neutrality
(CIN)." Both CEN and CIN assume general taxation of capital income and
47 See generally, Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law
and Economics, 18 EuR. J.L. & EcON. 259, 269-70 (2004).
48 See Barker, supra note 16, at 189.
49 See, e.g., Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, Has U.S. Investment
Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax Rates?, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND
MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 9 (James Hines Jr. ed., 2001); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON COMPANY
TAXATION 115 (1992); ALEX EASSON, TAXATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: AN
INTRODUCTION 17 (1999); Barker, supra note 12, at 365; Barker, supra note 16, at 178;
James R. Hines Jr. & Eric M. Rice, Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American
Business, 109 Q.J. ECON. 149 (1994).
50 For one of the earliest accounts, see R.A. Musgrave, Criteria for Foreign Tax Credit,
in TAXATION AND OPERATIONS ABROAD 83 (1960). For the leading economic analysis, see
Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation ofInternational Investment Income, 94 Q.J.
ECON. 793 (1980). For a general analysis of the issues, see Barker, supra note 16, at 188-95.
51 Barker, supra note 16, at 189-90. These are, of course, new forms of the old debate.
One version is ownership neutrality, where tax law should not prevent ownership by the
most efficient owner. See Mahir A. Desai, New Foundations for Taxing Multinational
Corporations, 82 Taxes 39 (2004). This is a CIN compatible theory. This author has
suggested a new take on the old debate suggesting that the proper principles should be a
reconciliation of CEN and CIN principles described as Value Export Neutrality and Value
Import Neutrality. The proscription is that "the country that is the source of the assets that
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source countries' legitimate power to tax the income from capital provided
by non-residents. Both theories recognize that it is the home countries'
response that will determine whether capital is efficiently allocated
worldwide. The theories differ as to what the resident countries' response
should be. CIN provides that capital should be taxed only at the same rate
as domestic capital in the host country. CIN results in source taxation only.
CEN provides that capital should be taxed at the same rate whether it is
utilized in the country of residence or elsewhere. CEN requires residence
taxation with appropriate double taxation relief.52
In a world with tax harmonization and the effective sharing of
information among governments, either approach would be an "efficient"
solution. In a world of tax competition, however, most economists and
legislators favor CEN because a nation that taxed only the domestic income
from capital would experience a large capital drain with economic
stagnation as a consequence. 54  Indeed, CIN principles do not lead to
effective source taxation of capital income. CIN's premise is that capital
will flow to the country where it achieves the highest return. CIN,
however, is post tax. The highest foreign return is tax free, or, alternatively,
any tax must be charged to the borrower and added on to the interest rate.55
This result holds true unless countries can agree on harmonized tax bases
and rates.5 ' Today source countries exempt from income taxation much of
the return from debt and other forms of capital. 57 The worldwide adoption
of CIN principles would mean the nontaxation of debt capital and many
provides the income-producing value should get the exclusive right to tax." Economic rents
should be taxed exclusively in the country of source. Barker, supra note 16, at 202. M.
Desai and J. Hines have challenged the usefulness of CEN and CIN and have proposed
instead the theory of ownership neutrality. They assert that tax rules should be evaluated by
the degree to which they insure that the identities of capital owners are unaffected by tax rate
differences, thereby allowing the market to allocate ownership rights to where they are most
productive. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Old Rules and New Realities:
Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT. TAX J. 937 (2004); Mihir A. Desai, New
Foundations for Taxing Multinational Corporation, 82 TAXES 39, 46 (2004).
52 See Barker, supra note 12, at 377-78.
5 Capital Importing countries would most likely favor CIN because it would provide
them with cheaper capital. Capital Exporting Nations would likely favor CEN because it
would protect their supplies of capital.
54 Assaf Razin & Efrain Sudka, International Tax Competition and Gains from Tax
Harmonization, 37 EcON. LETTERS 69, 75 (1991).
5 Charles R. Irish, International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at
Source, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 292, 303 (1974); Report on Double Taxation Submitted to
the Financial Committee by Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp,
League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73.F.19, at 8 (1923).
56 Razin & Sudka, supra note 54, at 71, 75.
s7 Mitsuhiro Fukao & Mesaharu Hanazaki, Internationalisation ofFinancial Markets and
the Allocation of Capital, 8 J. ECON. STUD. 35 (1987) (Countries hosting EUROBOND
market do not tax interest.).
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forms of equity capital."
Thus, the only practical and effective economic approach to the
taxation of income from capital is CEN.5 9 The traditional view is that CEN
theory supports residence-base, worldwide taxation of all income. 6 0 This
broad formulation is misleading, however, because both CEN and CIN only
address the taxation of income from capital. To the extent that income is
produced by factors other than capital, CEN and CIN are silent.
Consider this in terms of the four principle economic concerns of
international tax law: appropriate tax significance of domestic business
income, exports and imports, foreign capital investment, and resident's
foreign business income. CEN and CIN are principles of the efficient
allocation of capital income worldwide, that is, the use abroad of capital
owned by U.S. persons, and the use in the United States of the capital
owned by non-resident taxpayers. Though these theories provide critical
insights on neutral international tax principles, they are not designed to
provide all the answers.
To begin, capital income viewed from an international perspective
takes two forms. The first examines capital flows derived from private
investors. This investment is called Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI)
which can be defined as all private, non-Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
made by nonresidents.6 1 The second examines capital flows associated with
business activity. FDI can be defined as foreign investment undertaken by
a taxpayer where the investor owns 10% or more of the equity of the
business activity conducted.62
Under most approaches to sourcing income, capital income is sourced
where it is used or where the transaction takes place and not in the country
from which the capital was derived.63 Though some nations in the past
followed principles of strict territorial taxation, most nations today
implement a system of taxing FPI of their residents. 4 On the other hand,
where FPI is "sourced" in a country, it has always been a generally
recognized principle of international taxation that the source state has the
right to tax that income. The exercise of this right, however, is becoming
less common.
ss See Barker, supra note 12, at 373.
5 See PEGGY BREWER RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 8 (1963) (supporting CEN approach).
60 See Barker, supra note 16, at 163.
61 See GARY C. HUFBAUER, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME:
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 63 (1992); see also Barker, supra note 16, at 163.
62 HUFBAUER, supra note 61, at 63 n. 1.
63 See Hugh S. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of
the United States System and its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
33 (Assaf Razin & Joel S. Slemrod eds., 1990).
6 See Barker, supra note 16, at 194 nn.205-07.
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The U.S. has led the way in establishing the nontaxation of much of
the return from FPI provided by non-resident taxpayers. 65  Ineffective
source taxation attracts foreign capital and encourages domestic capital
flight. Nations experiencing capital flight can forego taxation of all income
from capital (thus converting a tax on all income into a tax solely on labor
income),66 or they can seek ways to effectively tax the worldwide
investment income of their residents. The world trend is in the direction of
resident taxation of capital income, 6  and most developed countries are
exploring measures to increase the effectiveness of their tax regimes.
Moreover, in light of the strong evidence that any source-based tax on
interest income is added to the cost of borrowing by the creditors, the
optimal solution would be a deduction for foreign taxes as opposed to the
allowance of a windfall foreign tax credit against resident taxes because the
foreign tax credit would overcompensate for the economic cost of foreign
taxes and continue the tax incentive for foreign investment as compared to
domestic.
Foreign Direct Investment and the taxation of business income present
a much different problem. The words themselves suggest both a more
active engagement of resources by the resident country and a more intimate
involvement of the foreign enterprise in the source country.
Countries hosting the economic activities of foreign taxpayers witness
the whole process of income production. Even though in some cases it may
be appropriate to view the income produced as a return on capital, as, for
instance, when business income is paid as dividends and interest to resident
taxpayers, when produced by a corporation or enterprise the income is the
consequence of many factors of production under the general categories of
capital and labor. Income is also attributed to the conditions extant in a
particular country (such as infrastructure and superstructure). Governments
provide many benefits to taxpayers and firms benefit from these inputs,
which aid income production. These benefits justify taxation.69
65 See I.R.C. § 871(h) (2006) (referring to individual portfolio interest), I.R.C. § 871(i)
(referring to individual deposits), I.R.C. § 881(c) (2006) (referring to foreign corporation
portfolio interest).
66 See VITO TANzI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 14 (1995).
67 One of President Obama's recent tax proposals is aimed at strengthening the system of
withholding and information gathering. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 41-42
(2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/grnbk09.pdf.
68 See John D. Wilson & David E. Wildasin, Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon, 88
J. PUB. EcoN. 1065, 1069 (2004).
It was Adam Smith who first linked the justification for taxation to the benefits
taxpayers receive from the state. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. 5, ch. 2,
pt. 2 (1904). See also Herwig J. Schlunk, Double Taxation: The Unappreciated Ideal, 102
TAX NOTEs 893 (2004) (stating that income can be a reasonable proxy for benefits a
corporation receives from a nation).
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Consequently, business income has a more complex make-up, and it
would be a daunting task to try to analyze the exact factor makeup of any
return. In general, most factor costs (with the exception of a normal return
on equity) are deducted in some manner from the tax base in determining
net income.70 Since governments do not directly charge for public goods
and services, these do not reflect actual costs and are, consequently, not
deductible.
The complex makeup of business income is largely ignored, however.
Business income is instead treated as a whole. Once assigned to a national
location, that country has the primary right to tax. But, contrary to the
consensus on FPI that resident taxation is appropriate, there is no consensus
on the residence country's right to tax foreign business income.7' This anti-
resident attitude is now reflected in the fact that most nations exempt the
foreign active business income of their corporations.7 2  Moreover, the
deferral of the tax on the income of U.S. owned foreign affiliates can
approximate the results of exemption depending on the length of the
exemption because it reduces the present discounted value of the tax
73obligation.
Three American scholars, however, have argued against this
worldwide trend. They have suqested instead worldwide taxation of
corporate income without deferral. They argue that the present system
creates excess avoidance possibilities, distorts economic decisions, and is
unfair to other American taxpayers. They illustrate their concerns with the
following example. Assume a U.S. company has 100 to invest either in the
United States or abroad. Assume that two investments were uncovered, a
U.S. investment with a pretax return of 20% and a foreign investment with
a pretax return of 15%. Assuming that the foreign nation does not impose
an income tax, and the United States would exempt (or defer) that income,
the U.S. company would prefer the less profitable foreign investment. The
conclusion is that this leads to capital flight and loss of American jobs.
70 The exception is the cost of equity.
7 See Klaus Vogel, Worldwide v. Source Taxation of Income-A Review and
Reevaluation of Arguments (Part II), 16 INTERTAX 310, 311-12 (1988) (stating that
government benefits should result in exclusive source taxation of multinational corporation's
income).
72 See supra note 31 for the recent examples of Japan and the United Kingdom.
7 Assume a tax obligation of $100 that does not have to be paid for 20 years. The
present value of the obligation to pay $100 at the end of 20 years at a discount rate of 8%
would be $21.50. Assuming a 50 year deferral, the present value of the obligation to pay
$100 at the end of 50 years at a discount rate of 8% would be $2.13. The formula is
p = A/(1 + r) with p = present price, A = amount, and r = interest rate. See MARVIN A.
CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES
AND CONCEPTS, 449-50 (2009).
74 See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David R.
Tillinghast Lecture: "What's Source Got to Do With It?" Source Rules and U.S.
International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REv. 81 (2002).
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Table 1 illustrates the consequences.
Table 1 - Comparison of Equity Investment
United States and Foreign - 100 Investment
United States (Taxed) Foreign (Exempt)
20% Return Pretax 15%
7% Tax (35% x 20% return) 0 tax (exempt or deferred)
13 % (after tax return) 15%
Though the example is useful in conveying some basic truths, it is too
simple to convey the subtleties of business income. It does illustrate the
CEN principle that exemption of foreign capital income creates a
substantial capital drain and/or higher domestic cost of capital. Thus, the
authors are correct in recognizing that an income exemption system (like
the deferral system) tips the competitive scales in favor of foreign
investment. The CEN principle, however, is concerned with the efficient
allocation of a nation's capital; thus its only application would be to the
element of business income that represents the normal return on capital. To
see the difference in the example where CEN principles are faithfully
followed, begin by reworking the example assuming that the investments
are both debt financed instead of equity financed.
Table 2 - Comparison of Debt Financed (8% Interest)
100 Investment - United States and Foreign
United States (Taxed) Foreign (Exempt)
20% Pretax Gross Return 15%
8% Interest Ded. 8%6
12 Pretax Net 7%
4.2% Tax (35% x 12) 0 Tax (Exempt)
7.8 % Post Tax Return 7% Post Tax Return
Comparing Table 1 and Table 2 shows that a critical problem of a
7 Eight percent was arbitrarily chosen as a market value return on a debt investment.
Changing the rate would change the absolute calculations but not the point of the illustration.
76 The tax on the interest paid on the debt is not reflected in the Table because it could
be paid to anyone, who might or might not be a U.S. taxpayer.
660
International Tax Reform Should Begin at Home
30:647 (2010)
deferral or exemption system is the deferral on the exemption of the return
on equity capital. Whereas in Table 1, the return from equity capital was
not included in the U.S. tax base, the comparative tax advantage created a
huge incentive for the foreign location. Where both investments were debt
financed, however, the balance changed significantly. There the normal
return from debt, which was arbitrarily assigned an 8% return, was
excluded from both the United States and the foreign tax base.
This suggests an alternative to deferral or the exemption of active
business income. This alternative is the foreign exemption of true profit or
economic rents. Economic rents are the return that is left when the normal
cost of capital is accounted for.7 7 Taxation of economic rents is generally
accomplished by a cashflow or expenditure tax.78 Exemption of economic
rents requires a different approach. One way to determine the exempt
amount for purposes of foreign exclusion would be to begin with the
foreign active income base and impute a normal capital return on equity as
an interest payment from foreign corporation to U.S. parent. 79 This is
illustrated in Table 3. The difference between Tables 2 and 3 is that in
Table 2, any investor could have earned the actual interest charge and
taxation of that amount depends on the residence of the investor. In Table
3, the beneficiary of the equity return is the U.S. parent and that return
should be currently included in its income.
Table 3 - Comparison of Equity Financed
100 Investment with an 8% Normal Return Imputed
United States (Taxed) Foreign (Tax normal return only)
20% Pretax 15%
7% Tax (35% x 20%) 2.8% U.S. tax on 8% return (35% x 8%)
13% Post tax return 13.2% Post tax return
Treating the equity capital component of FDI the same as FPI makes
sense because, to the owner of capital, every investment should make at
least a normal return. Corporations, however, seek to employ their own
capital in a venture in order to make a net present value investment; that is a
return that exceeds the net cost of capital.80 Table 2 illustrates the result
that both investments produce a net present value return. In the case of the
RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 280 (2006).
78 Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a
Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter? 47 TAx L. REv. 377 (1992).
79 This is illustrated in Table 3.
80 See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 77, at 17.
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foreign enterprise, this is 15% pre-tax and 7% post-tax. In the case of the
U.S. enterprise, it is 12% pretax and 7.8% post tax. These figures illustrate
that in all likelihood, the multinational will wish to make both investments.
That is, both investments yield a net present value return. The
multinational will be encouraged to raise additional capital in the market
because both of these investments yield returns greater than the cost of
capital.
The distortions created by the exemption or deferral of equity income
can also change a marginal pre-tax return into a positive post-tax return and
a sub-marginal pre-tax return into a positive post-tax return. Take the
example of a U.S. taxpayer with 100 of equity to invest, which that
taxpayer could lend at 8% interest. Thus, 8% would be the opportunity cost
of capital.
Table 4: Comparison of 100 Equity Financed U.S. v. Foreign
United States (taxed) Foreign Exempt
8% Pretax 8%
2.8% Tax (.35% - 8%) 0 Tax
5.2% Post Tax Return 8 %
Table 4 illustrates what happens when the investment yields no more
than a normal return on capital. The after-tax disparity is large. Table 4
demonstrates that the U.S. investor would not invest at any lower pre-tax
rate because it would have both a pre- and post-tax return that would be
lower than if it simply lent the money. In terms of the foreign investment,
however, this would not be the case. The pretax return could be dropped
from 8% to as low as 5.3% and still have a greater after-tax return than the
U.S. investment by the U.S. taxpayer. Due to the tax incentive, the foreign
enterprise could earn a sub-marginal return. This is an inefficient result
from the U.S. perspective.
A territorial cash flow exemption system, which results in the
exemption of economic rents, does not share this error.
Table 5 - Comparison of 100 Equity Investment
(Normal Return Imputed to Foreign Investment)
United States (taxed) Foreign (Exempt w/ 8% Interest Imputed)
8% (Pretax) 8%
2.8% (Tax 35% x 8%) 2.8% (Tax 35% of 8%)
5.2 Post Tax 5.2 Post Tax
662
International Tax Reform Should Begin at Home
30:647 (2010)
Here, there is no advantage. Moreover, the foreign enterprise would
not invest at a sub-marginal rate because it would create a subnormal return
as follows.
Table 6 - Comparison of 100 Equity Investment
(Normal Return Imputed to Foreign Investment)
United States (Taxed) Foreign (Exempt w/ 8% Interest Imputed)
8% (Pre Tax) 7% (Pre tax)
2.8% (Tax 35% x 8%) 2.8% (Tax 35% x 8%)
5.2% Post Tax 4.2% Post Tax
Systems that exempt or defer business income must face the clear,
inefficient consequence that they distort the location of business activity
due to their treatment of equity capital. The U.S. taxpayer's business can
utilize three kinds of equity capital: money, exported physical assets, and
exported intangible assets. These are all mobile assets. Though CEN is
typically described in terms of money capital, its underlying premise is
applicable to all forms of capital. Where capital is mobile, countries will
compete for that capital through lower tax rates.
The present U.S. income tax system addresses the flight of some
mobile capital by requiring that the return from intangibles used abroad be
currently taxed. Either the value of the intangible is reflected in the price
of property sold, or, when the intangible is transferred as an equity
investment to a controlled foreign corporation it will be treated as
transferred on the basis of an arm's length royalty commensurate with the
productivity of that asset.82 In addition, actual interest payments are also
taxed. This scheme is also suggested for proposed territorial exemption
systems.83 These provisions that reflect the home taxation of the income
from money or intangible capital derived or produced in the U.S. reflect
CEN principles because they result in home taxation of the income from
capital wherever it is used. What these systems do not address is the
income attributed to equity, which includes transferred equity and retained
earnings. To the extent that the income derived from equity capital escapes
the tax net, CIN principles, not CEN principles, control. Thus, both deferral
and exemption systems follow CIN principles with regard to equity capital.
Thus a foreign active business income exemption system creates the
at 1.R.C. § 367(d) (2006) (noting that most transfers of intangible assets are taxable
regardless of whether they are used in a foreign business).
82 id.
83 See Michael J. Graetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis, Structuring an Exemption System for
Foreign Income of US. Corporations, 54 NAT'L TAX. J. 771, 775 (2001).
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same kind of economic problem that the present system of deferral creates.
Whereas a system of deferral defers the tax on the income from the normal
return on equity capital, an exemption system eliminates the tax altogether.
Nations compete for mobile factors of production, including capital in all of
its forms with tax incentives, thus diminishing the effect of source
taxation.84 This treatment of equity capital as one reason why there is little
effective taxation of the foreign income of multinationals.
B. Fairness
Both FDI and FPI involve the proper taxation by the nation from
which the capital was derived. Though this right is usually thought of in
terms of a nation's right to tax the income of its residents, this right can also
be fairly seen in terms of the territorial right of a nation to tax the value it
has added to the world.
Since FPI is solely a matter of the taxation of capital income, it is
appropriate to focus on home taxation by the country of residence where the
capital value was created. FDI, however, is different because it involves
business income which is produced by many factors in addition to capital.
Unlike the weak economic justification that source countries have for the
taxation of imported capital, source countries have a paramount claim to the
taxation of noncapital business income.
Thus, any claim by a home nation to tax the noncapital portion of FDI
is a residual claim of residence. Since only corporations get the benefit of
deferral, corporations are the only practical vehicle for foreign business
operations. Thus, worldwide taxation of noncapital business income is
essentially a question of corporate residence. In many cases, questions of
corporate residence are immaterial. Since corporations can easily divvy up
their operations in separate corporate entities, subsidiary corporations can
minimize the effect of residence classification and residence-based taxation
by carefully limiting the activity of a "resident" corporation (no matter what
the definition) to those activities that would normally be sourced and taxed
in that "resident" country. Ultimately, however, parent organizations must
deal with countries that assert, in principle, worldwide taxation based on a
corporation's residence.
Nations adopting resident taxation have always taxed, in principle, the
worldwide income of their corporations. There is no general consensus,
however, as to what makes a corporate resident. Nations have adopted
quite different jurisdictional classifications, including place of
84 This has been particularly true in the case of emerging economies. See generally
Barker, supra note 12, at 363-67 (discussing how emerging economies relinquish much of
their source tax base through tax preferences and incentives).
85 See Barker, supra note 16, at 195-97 (demonstrating that the primary economic right
to tax the income from capital in all of its forms is the state where the capital was created).
86 Fewer nations today follow the worldwide principle with respect to business income.
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incorporation, place of central management and control, and principle place
of business.87  For new corporations, there is considerable choice in
choosing residence. For existing corporations, though tax is a strong
incentive to change residence, changing residence is difficult without
adverse tax and political consequences.
David Tillinghast has called corporate residence a "crude, if not naive,
criterion."88 A concept that originally conceptualized the legal status of
individuals is quite difficult to apply to corporations. Though corporations
are legal persons, it is arbitrary to apply the unitary legal concept of
residence to what are essentially economic enterprises conducted
throughout the world and identified by far flung assets, personal activities,
owners, and different legal persona. Though it has been suggested that the
residence of the owners is a better approach to corporate residence, that
approach also lacks the capacity to capture the full dynamics of a firm.89
Since all approaches to corporate residence lack either theoretical
justification or practical merit, there is no compelling case for worldwide
tax on the basis of corporate residence. Since there is no special
relationship between a nation and its corporations sufficient to justify non-
arbitrary taxation, commentators turn to fundamental fairness as a guide to
deciding what should be done. 90
Fair allocation of taxes among taxpayers is a significant normative
goal of a system of taxation. Adam Smith's first canon of taxation was that
taxes should be equal or equitable.91  The classic view was that the
allocation of the tax burden was fair where each person contributed in
accordance with the benefits he or she receives from government services. 92
The exchange or benefit principle of taxation is the primary theory that
underlies source-based international taxation. 93 The modern theory that
supports resident-based, comprehensive income taxation has shifted from
benefit received to ability to pay. 94 Ability to pay switches the focus from
an exchange principle where tax is justified on the basis of benefit received
to a system of obligation based on status; that is, the special relationship
between the taxpayer and a state. This status justifies worldwide taxation
8 HUGH L. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL
ANALYSIS 349-50 (2004).
8 David R. Tillinghast, A Matter ofDefinitions: "Foreign" and "Domestic" Taxpayers,
2 INT'L TAX AND Bus. LAw. 237, 260 (1984).
89 See Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV.
261, 323 (2001) (arguing that shareholder residence is not a practical solution).
90 See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Perspectives on
the Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation Debate, 125 TAX NOTES 1079, 1091-93 (2009).
91 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. 5, ch. 2, pt. 2 (1904).
92 Barker, supra note 34, at 24.
9 DAVID R. TILLINGHAST, TAX ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 3 (1984).
94 Barker, supra note 16, at 187.
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without regard to actual benefits received by the taxpayer. Ability to pay is
also linked to comprehensive taxation, progressivity, and assessment of
each individual's personal circumstances. The requirement that a taxpayer
contribute in accordance with her ability to pay is primarily societal equity.
It is also individual equity when viewed from the perspective of the
taxpayer as a social being, treated as a whole with all of the burdens and
benefits of social life. 95
This individual approach to equity is not, however, a useful paradigm
for corporations. This personalized, highly nuanced concept of ability to
pay has nothing to do with corporations even though it has everything to do
with corporate shareholders.9 It is acknowledged even by those who
advocate for worldwide taxation of corporations that these entities "pose
perplexing issues in evaluating fairness concems."97 These scholars shift
from a dynamic conception of fairness to a mechanical one; they justify
comprehensive taxation on the basis that taxation of income is justified by a
taxpayer's command over these resources. Command translates into
ability."
A second important aspect of fairness is taxpayer fairness.
Undoubtedly, this is one of the most important issues in international
taxation.99 It is a matter of international consensus that residents' countries
must do something to mitigate the problem of international double taxation,
either by exempting foreign source income or by providing a foreign tax
credit.10 The claim of individual taxpayer equity, however, necessarily
suppresses the claims of resident taxpayer equality because the claim to tax
by the resident country is either abandoned in an exemption system or is
offset by foreign taxes paid in a credit system. A tax paid to a foreign
government is not the same as a tax paid to one's own government since
these funds are not available to provide goods and services to resident
taxpayers.10
A third important aspect of fairness is fairness between governments.
Governments have conflicting claims to the same tax base. The result of
exempting active business income is that the income sourced or attributed
to a particular nation is solely taxable by that nation. This results in
95 Id. at 188.
96 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax 38-39 (Univ. of Mich. Law, Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
04-006, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-516202 (advocating that corporate
taxation is a regulatory measure aimed at restricting corporate (or management) power).
This supports taxation of corporations based on benefit received, not ability to pay.
9 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 90, at 1092.
98 Id. at 1093.
99 See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 659.
100 See Articles of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 23
(2003) (outlining the credit and exemption method for the elimination of double taxation).
101 Barker, supra note 16, at 185-86.
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exclusive territorial taxation of active business income. Worldwide
taxation with foreign tax credit relief merely defers to the source country
acknowledging the source country's primary right to tax. To the extent that
the source country's effective rate is not as high as the resident country's
effective rate, the resident country captures the residual. In the United
States, this is not a current tax; it is a deferred tax when the income is
earned by a controlled foreign corporation.10 2 A deferred tax has a smaller
present value to the government and a smaller present cost to the
taxpayer. 103
There is a profound difference in the concept of entitlement advanced
by the resolution of the different claims of fairness contained in the
different approaches to international taxation. Territorial taxation is based
on the generally accepted principle that a nation has the right to tax income
where that country is the source of the economic activity. Resident
countries assert that residence is an independent basis for taxation.
Worldwide taxation's focus is on the taxpayer whose relation to a nation is
such that it is fair to tax that person according to her means. International
equity in a residence system is a nonnegotiable deal-the resident country
will relinquish its tax claim if and only to the extent that the source country
taxes. 0 The benefit of the resident country's deferral flows to the taxpayer
because there would be no effect if the source country applied the same
effective rates to the income.
Though this may appear to be a fair resolution from the point of view
of the residence country, it may not be fair from the point of view of the
source country. A source country has only one choice with respect to the
tax base that has been assigned to it where the taxpayer is subject to another
country's worldwide tax. Assuming a source country does not discriminate,
it may be very difficult for it to tax the business income of foreign
taxpayers where only some of those taxpayers are residents of worldwide
taxing countries and the majority are not residents of such countries. These
countries cannot be in total control of their tax policies.'0o
These fiscal policies include the right of a source nation to forego
taxes in order to achieve certain social or economic goals. The choice not
102 Subpart F of the Code provides an exception to the rule of deferral for certain types of
income earned by controlled foreign corporations. See generally I.R.C. § 951 (2006).
103 See supra note 73.
104 Some countries that have adopted worldwide tax principles have adopted limited
exemptions for their multinationals for business activities in emerging nations. This practice
is known as tax sparing. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX SPARING: A
RECONSIDERATION 12-13, 68-69 (1998) [hereinafter OECD, TAX SPARING]. Though the
United States has considered tax sparing and other incentives for providing aid to emerging
economies over the years, none have ever been adopted. For a detailed history, see Robert
Hellawell, United States Income Taxation and Less Developed Countries: A Critical
Appraisal, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1393, 1406 (1966).
105 See Barker, supra note 12, at 385-86.
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to tax is just as much a part of fiscal sovereignty as the choice to tax.
Worldwide tax limits that choice of source countries, especially for
emerging economies.
In addition, to the extent that the tax base that is the subject of
territorial tax is attributable to value that is added to the world by the source
country, a case can be made that the source country should have the
exclusive right to tax. Income can represent such value where the ability to
earn such income is attributable to the benefits provided by the source
country and that country's special endowments. An exemption system
solves this problem of intergovernmental equity by assigning the potential
to tax this income exclusively to the country that added this value to the
world. However, full exclusion of active business income goes farther than
necessary. The value that the source nation added to the world does not
include the normal income return from imported capital. Thus, it is the
portion of income which is the income over and above the normal return on
capital-economic rents-which is the appropriate amount to exclude.106
Source countries, especially emerging economies, have a fairness claim to
economic rents worthy of special consideration. On the other hand, resident
countries have a fairness claim to the value derived from the use of capital
exported from their countries.
The claims of fairness represent conflicting issues of philosophy and
politics. The resolution of these issues can easily take a pro-resident form
when applied to individuals. But when considering fairness issues in regard
to corporate business income, one should question whether the ties a
corporation has to a particular jurisdiction are sufficient to tax foreign
economic rents in the light of the factors of source country contribution.
C. Tax Competition and Business Competitiveness
Tax competition is a nation's relinquishment, in whole or part, of its
right to tax an economic activity, with the result that the effective tax is less
than that of other countries. 10 Due to the increasing mobility of capital,
economic activity, financial services, and skilled labor, many developed
nations see certain practices of other countries as unfairly attracting
economic activity that otherwise would have taken place within the
developed countries, causing an erosion "of the tax base of these countries
and distorting the location of such economic activity."108
There are many cost factors that influence the decision as to the
location of business operations. Though a foreign direct investment in a
106 See id. at 383-85.
107 See Barker, supra note 16, at 172.
108 ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEV., TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX COOPERATION:
REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE
COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS 5 (2000). See also Barker, supra note 16, at 165.
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country would rarely be made solely for tax considerations, today tax is one
of the most important factors.'o As long as countries provide tax
incentives for nonresidents, multinational enterprises will take advantage of
the incentives.110  Indeed, business argues that in the world of tax
competition, business must take advantage of low tax jurisdictions in order
to remain competitive with the multinationals from other developed
countries.'"
The competitive posture of U.S. enterprises should be a matter of
importance to U.S. lawmakers. Though multinational corporations assert
that residence tax makes them less competitive,112 direct evidence is sparse
and inconclusive." 3
The U.S. Treasury Department has referred to the success of U.S.
enterprises as evidence that U.S. enterprises are quite successful
overseas.114 The literature also cites to the lack of significant evidence as to
the competitive disadvantage of U.S. multinationals."' There is even
indirect evidence that the present system can work as a competitive
109 See ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD TAX POLICY STUDIES No. 4,
CORPORATE TAX INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 10 (2001); Barker, supra
note 16, at 198.
110 See John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 272
(1999).
" See, e.g., BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE OECD, A BUSINESS
VIEW ON TAX COMPETITION (1999), available at http://www.biac.org/statements/tax/htc.pdf;
Daniel J. Mitchel, OECD Tax Competition Proposal: Higher Taxes and Less Privacy, 89
TAX NOTES 801, 801-02 (2000).
112 See BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE OECD, supra note 111, at
3.
113 See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME
EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 55-59 (2000), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/subpartf.pdf (discussing the effect of U.S.
taxation on the competitiveness of U.S. multinationals). Though it is certain that the present
U.S. tax system is overly complex and that it is expensive for taxpayers to comply with,
Marsha Blumenthal & Joel Slemrod, The Compliance Cost of Taxing Foreign Source
Income: Its Magnitude, Determinants, and Policy Implications, 2 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 37,
37 ( 1995) (study showed that 40% of the compliance costs of U.S. multinationals were
attributed to taxation of foreign source income even though only 20% of these
multinationals' economic activities were in foreign operations), see also Robert J. Peroni,
Deferral of U.S. Tax on International Income: End It, Don't Mend It-Why Should We Be
Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F?, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1609 (2001), the same can be said
about other countries, see OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE
DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 58-61
(2003) (discussing the similar complexity of foreign systems).
114 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 90, at 1086. See also J. Clifton Fleming Jr.,
Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79, 107 n.93,
n.95 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni, & Shay, Worse than Exemption].
1' See Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Taxing Multinationals in a World with Portfolio
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advantage for U.S. multinationals. 116 The system permits taxpayers to
average the credit on high-taxed business income with low-taxed business
income thus reducing the effective overall tax. Second, the appropriate
U.S. tax on foreign interest, royalties, and rents is reduced if these flows are
converted into deferred income. The evidence strongly indicates that
multinationals engage in significant income shifting between high and low
tax jurisdictions to take advantage of these systemic failures.117
Indeed, an underlying reason for the move of many nations to a
territorial exemption system for active business income is to ensure the
current taxation of income from rents, royalties, and interest." 8 Exemption
systems must place high priority on segregating these sources from business
income that is exempt. By exempting business income, foreign taxes on
active business income cannot be credited against these more passive forms
of capital income. 119 The result is that, if successful, nations raise more
taxes by exempting active business income than by taxing it under present
principles. In the United States, the Joint Committee on Taxation projected
that a territorial exemption system would increase revenues by 54.8 billion
dollars over a ten year period when measured against revenues under the
existing law.120
Studies show that the incidence of tax under our present system is not
a significant burden. A recent study showed that the tax on repatriated
earnings of U.S. multinationals is only approximately 3.3%. 121 Since this
tax is only assessed when earnings are repatriated, the effective tax on these
earnings, in terms of the present value of the tax when the income was
earned, may have been insignificant.122
Since that study, Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004.123 In that Act, Congress adopted a number of changes to the U.S.
international tax rules that reduced the U.S. taxation of foreign business
income.124  These changes continued a trend toward rules that may be
applied to achieve a very low effective rate of taxation of foreign business
116 See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, supra note 74, at 149.
117 See Harry Grubert, Intangible Income, Intercompany Transactions, Income Shifting,
and the Choice ofLocation, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 221, 221-24 (2003).
118 See HM TREASURY, PROPOSALS FOR CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS REFORM:
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 21, 23 (2010) (U.K.) (noting that in light of a more territorial
approach to taxing subsidiaries, rules should control the artificial diversion of profits from
the U.K. since there is a continuing need to protect the U.K. tax base from erosion).
119 See Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 83, at 775.
120 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 427 (Comm. Print 2005).
121 Altshuler & Grubert, supra note 33, at 798.
122 See supra note 73.
123 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, supra note 8.
124 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 654.
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income.12 5
Thus, the evidence is fairly strong that there is little that present law
does that harms the competitiveness of our multinationals other than impose
significant compliance costs. Indeed, the evidence appears to point to just
the opposite conclusion-that is, that our present system may instead
provide a significant tax subsidy to our multinationals, giving them a
competitive edge over those multinationals based in other developed
countries.126 This is probably true only for those companies that enjoy
sophisticated tax _planning, however.12 7 For those corporations in an excess
credit position,12 there is an incentive to create additional foreign income
that will go untaxed. For those corporations in an excess limit position,
there is an incentive to create additional deferred income.
V. THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF
BUSINESS INCOME
The prior analysis has underscored the major economic and equitable
problems with the present system. The present system of worldwide
taxation with deferral for active business income is an example of a system
that evidences a structure compatible with CEN principles of neutrality but
does not fully grasp all the problems with carefully identifying income from
capital. It acknowledges fairness, but only one-sided American government
or American taxpayer fairness. It shares a trait in common with other
developed countries in that it perceives its system as a victim of tax
competition, and that the principle culprits are developing countries and tax
havens. 129
The truth of the matter is that the developed countries, which control
much of the world's wealth and most of its international commerce, have
created the system that has failed. The reasons are basic to the system and,
hence, have eluded resolution. This is true not only for systems, like the
US, which nominally adopt the principle of worldwide taxation of business
income, but also for those systems that aim solely at the source taxation of
business income.
One reason is that all systems depend on the critical role played by the
125 Id. at 692-717.
126 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 114, at 85, 149
(explaining how the various features of the present system make the present system at least
as generous as a properly designed territorial exemption system).
127 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 7 17.
128 A corporation is in an excess credit position where its allowable credits are limited by
section 904. I.R.C. § 904 (2006). A corporation is in an excess limit position where its
foreign taxes are fully creditable.
129 See G-20 Leaders, Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, para. 15 (Sept. 24-25,
2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh-summit leaders-statement
_250909.pdf; Barker, supra note 16, at 169-71.
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sourcing rules and source taxation. The difficulty of international tax
principles begins with the concept of source itself. The source rules are the
product of a time when practically all nations taxed territorially, most
nations had significant legislation restricting the export of capital, national
economies were relatively closed, and most income tax systems were quite
unsophisticated.130  Freer trade and freer factor mobility have made the
traditional territorial notion of taxation obsolete,13' and have placed
considerable pressure on the ability of nations to apply transaction-based
tax to a vast range of common transactions.132
Current approaches to sourcing income based on the location of things
and events cannot hope to capture those factors that demonstrate that
income belongs to a particular country.' 33  There are many factors that
contribute to the earning of a particular receipt, including capital in all its
forms, labor, and benefits provided by governments. It is commonplace for
these factors to be identified with several different nations' source rules, by
fixing on one aspect of an income-producing event, necessarily ignoring the
contribution provided by the other factors. Consequently, source rules have
little to do with the economic connection of income to a country. This has
resulted in many sourcing approaches to the same items.' 34
Countries chose their source rules to achieve many different
objectives. Some countries adopt different source rules for inbound and for
outbound transactions or residents and non-residents.135  Often countries
that have traditionally taxed only on a source basis have adopted broad
domestic sourcing rules in order to approximate resident, worldwide
taxation. 136 The consequence of the multiplicity of national rules is that
130 See generally Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 16, at 1021 (providing an account of the
history and context of the adoption of the current system of international tax norms). See
also Barker, supra note 16, at 182-5.
131 Barker, supra note 12, at 349.
132 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 658.
133 Barker, supra note 16, at 182-85 (account of the different approaches to source rules).
34 id.
13s Id. at 203 (description of three principle approaches to sourcing income).
136 Id. at 202 (stating that source rules are often inconsistent); see also INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 42 (Am. L. Inst., Tentative Draft No. 10,
1983) (noting that in the United States, the single set of source rules is not entirely
symmetrical for U.S.-source income and foreign-source income), citing Comm'r for Inland
Revenue v. Lever Bros., 1946 AD 441 (A) (S. Afr.); First Nat'l Bank of Southern Africa v.
Comm'r for Inland Revenue 2002(3) SA 375 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Millin v. Comm'r for Inland
Revenue, 1928 AD 207 (A) (S. Afr.). The over reliance on source can easily create an over
extension of the source rules. In Apartheid South Africa, for example, the principle of
sourcing adopted by the courts included where the contract was made, where funds were
made available to the debtor, the residence of the debtor, and the relevant factual matrix
which focused on relevant business activities rather than the specific transactions. These
rules provide many different approaches to a finding of South African source. See generally,
Katz Fifth Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax
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there is little consistency between national rules. This results in some cases
in the unwarranted extension of the territorial reach of income tax laws
because the primary right to tax cannot exist in several countries at the same
time. In other cases these rules often result in inappropriate avoidance of
territorial taxation. Whenever there is a disconnect between formal rules of
sourcing and economic substance, there is latitude for tax planning and
avoidance.
Resident taxation also depends on source rules for application of
deferral regimes and for proper application of double taxation relief either
through credit or exemption. Multinationals can also game resident rules
through international source manipulation.137
One way to cure the defects would be to attempt to reform the source
rules.138  To accomplish anything, however, would take the reversal of
almost a one hundred year tradition that arbitrarily assigns income based on
isolated aspects of a transaction. What would be needed is a radical change
in the way nations source income in order to find a sufficient economic tie
between income and a location. Taxation of income, irrespective of who
the taxpayer is, requires a strong economic justification for it to be effective
and truly legitimate. These are proposals for source rules based on
economic nexus.139 Though a nation which adopted an economic nexus for
source might have considerable success improving its system, unless other
countries followed suit, the different treatment among nations will continue
to be an incentive to manipulate.
Source taxation is not solely about identifying the connection between
income and a territory. It is also about whether a nation should exercise its
tax power solely on the basis of source. Though territorial taxation of
business income must start with the proper placement of business income
within that country, most nations conclude that mere source is not
sufficient. Most countries require that business income be taxed only if it is
the result of a substantial level of activity within the country, such as the
income is derived by a permanent establishment within the country.140
Where a foreign enterprise does not meet the minimum standard, there is no
Structure of South Africa, Basing the South African Income Tax System on the Source or
Residence Principle - Options and Recommendations para. 1.3.3, 6.3.1.1 (March 7, 1997),
available at www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/katz/5.pdf (discussing source taxation
as a general rule but residence taxation for passive income generated abroad, including
royalties).
137 Shay, Fleming & Peroni, supra note 74, at 145.
138 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 90, at 1079.
139 An economic analysis of source was initially proposed to the League of Nations for its
adoption. See Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by
Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc.
E.F.S.73.F.19 (1923). For a more modem suggestion, see Barker, supra note 16, at 202-12
(outlining how income could be sourced based on significant economic affinity).
140 Articles of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 5 (2003).
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source taxation. This source gap leaves substantial latitude for business
between developed countries to be carried out through a foreign corporation
located in a low-tax jurisdiction.
Lack of economically sound sourcing rules, high thresholds for the
source taxation of business income, and inaccuracies and inconsistencies in
income and expense classification also lead to problems with foreign tax
credits. Not only can U.S. multinationals average the tax through business
activities in high and low tax countries, they have been able, through
manipulation of the forms of capital and business income, to offset highly-
taxed business income with low taxed capital income. 141
These problems are exacerbated by the shifting of income and
deductions through pricing. Aggressive transfer pricing within the firm can
dramatically change the allocation of income worldwide.142 This leads to
the distortion of locational decisions for economic activities.
In order for countries like the United States to try to maintain the
appearance of worldwide taxation of all income, the legislatures are
required to enact complex anti-avoidance measures. 143  Though these
measures have been successful, their success depends on the imposition of
significant, compliance costs for both taxpayers and government. 4
VI. FUNDAMENTAL REFORM: THE CURRENT DEBATE
Congress has many choices available to deal with the serious defects in
the present system. This section will address the current debate as to the
wisdom and efficacy of these choices based on the previous analysis that
the root of America's problems is not the vagaries of politics but a disregard
of certain critical principles of economic efficiency and fairness. This
section will evaluate these proposals in terms of their fit with the principles
of good taxation, their ability to deal effectively with the defects of the
present system, and their ability to promote critical goals of international
tax reform, namely, increasing revenue, protecting the domestic tax base,
and promoting increased U.S. economic development and jobs.
This section starts by considering present proposals on incremental
141 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 114, at 132.
142 Id. at 119-31; Barker, supra note 16, at 174-77. Though most nations have adopted
anti-abuse measures to curb transfer pricing abuse, see AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 87, at
420-24, compliance is a major problem. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
09-934, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: STUDY COUNTRIES THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN-SOURCED
INCOME FACE COMPLIANCE RISKS AND BURDENS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE UNITED STATES
19-22 (2009).
143 See I.R.C. § 951 (2006) (U.S. corporations are taxed on certain income of their
controlled foreign corporations in order to prevent the erosion of the U.S. tax base).
4 See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 87, at 378 (describes controlled foreign corporation
schemes in other countries).
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reforms.14 5 It will then turn to consideration of three recently suggested
systematic reforms including worldwide taxation without deferral, 146
worldwide taxation with exemption for foreign active business income, 147
and worldwide income with exemption for foreign territorial business cash
flow. 148
A. Incremental Reform
The outline of President Obama's legislative agenda announced in
2009149 has drawn both praise and criticism. It has been praised as a step in
the right direction 5 o for it addresses the goals of increased revenue and
protecting the tax base. It has been criticized because it is out of step with
the systems of the rest of the world and it will lead to a less competitive
U.S. foreign presence.'51 One truth in these assertions is that incremental
reform requires tradeoffs.
The Obama plan for business income has three principle components.
The first addresses the problem of allowing deductions against U.S.
domestic tax liability for expenditures incurred by domestic taxpayers that
are attributable to deferred income earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
multinationals.' 52 The second proposes to tighten the rules to prevent the
cross-crediting of foreign tax credits between high and low taxed
regimes. 5 3 The third addresses the problem of disregarded entities created
under the check-the-box rules that prevent the intended operation of anti-
deferral legislation,154 namely Subpart F which deals with controlled
14S See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 67, at 28-40 for President Obama's
suggested international legislative agenda.
146 Stephen Shay, Clifton Fleming and Robert Peroni have been the leading proponents of
this view. See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting
Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV.
455 (1999).
147 The majority of the world's nations have already adopted a variation of these systems.
See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 11.
148 The author has set out the parameters of such a system. See, e.g., Barker, supra note
16.
149 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 67, at 28-40.
1so See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Tax Reform in the (Multi)National Interest, 124 TAX NOTES
389 (2009). But see William B. Barker, Tax Reform in the (Inter)National Interest: Why
Wait, 124 TAX NOTES 828 (2009).
15 Kristen A. Parillo, Panelists Find Fault with Obama's International Tax Proposals,
123 TAX NoTEs 1387 (2009).
152 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 67, at 29.
... Id. at 30-31.
154 Id. at 28.
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foreign corporations.155
Of the three proposals affecting business income, it is hard to fault the
first proposal on cross crediting. It is aimed at closing a loophole that could
be used to zero out low taxed income. 156 The other two proposals,
however, show how difficult it may be to achieve important objectives in
the international setting.
The second proposal is designed to limit the application of the check-
the-box rules. 157 The 1997 application of these rules in the international
setting opened a large loophole in the anti-deferral rules of Subpart F. The
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates indicate that the proposed
reform would raise $31 billion in revenue over ten years.' 58 The check-the-
box rules, however, opened up a much larger loophole that has nothing
directly to do with U.S. taxes. It allowed U.S. multinationals to reduce
profits from high-tax countries, thus reducing these countries' effective tax
rates. 159 The effect of this reform may well be to increase the revenue
gained by high-tax countries. 1o This would add to multinationals' foreign
tax credits, which could reduce the amount that would otherwise be
collected by the U.S. Treasury. This consequence may be reflected in the
revised revenue estimates of the JCT which decreased the revenue estimates
of Treasury by $55 billion.161
The third proposal deals with the proper matching of deductions to
foreign source income. In general, when a U.S. taxpayer incurs any
expense related to the production of income, it would be a deduction. If
that expenditure were not allocated to foreign income that it produced, it
would distort the net foreign income. Either it would increase foreign
source income currently taxable in a way that could decrease overall U.S.
tax liability due to the allowance of extra foreign tax credits,162 or it would
increase the deferred income of controlled foreign corporations at the same
time as decreasing U.S. income subject to tax. 63
The difficulty is not with direct expenditures which present a rather
15 I.R.C. § 951 (2006).
156 Martin A. Sullivan, A Simple Overview of the Obama International Tax Proposals,
123 TAX NOTES 1301, 1302 (2009).
'5 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2009).
158 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET
PROPOSAL As DESCRIBED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MAY 2009 JCX-28-09
(2009), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3558
[hereinafter JCT REPORT].
159 See Sullivan, supra note 156, at 1301.
160 Id.
161 JCT REPORT, supra note 158.
162 For a general discussion of this problem, see Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than
Exemption, supra note 114, at I 10-15.
161 Id. at 116-18.
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straightforward problem of allocation. The difficulty instead is with
indirect expenditures like research and development (R&D), general and
administrative (G&A), and interest. The Obama Proposals focus solely on
G&A and interest. The most likely reason that they ignore R&D is that
R&D is already the subject of a very complex system of cost allocation
between U.S. and foreign source income. The G&A proposal differs
from the R&D regulations in that it does not simply allocate expenditures to
foreign source income for current U.S. tax purposes, but it allocates certain
expenditures to the income earned by controlled foreign corporations with
the consequence that these expenditures will be denied current deductibility
and deferred until repatriation of the profits.16 5 There have been reports,
however, that G&A may be eliminated as the bill progresses.166
This proposal illustrates the dilemma of reform where there are so
many variables of policy. R&D makes a good illustration of the complex
tradeoffs for policy. For example, it contributes significantly to corporate
wealth by creating intangible capital. These expenditures are currently
deductible even though under general principles of income taxation, these
costs should be capitalized and deducted ratably over the useful life of the
value created.
Allowing a deduction for what otherwise would be a capital
expenditure is an example of a tax expenditure. A nation rebates its tax in
order to incentivize a particular activity. In the case of R&D, the case for
tax relief is very strong. Technology development is an important element
in the development of the wealth of a country, especially the United States.
Research and Development has many positive externalities. It has a
spillover effect that benefits others who did not incur the expenditure nor
develop the technology. 6 1
Allowing a deduction for a capital expenditure, however, which is a
cash flow or expenditure tax concept, is the equivalent of not taxing the
normal return from those investments. Where the technologies produced
by deducted expenditures are used domestically, the government taxes the
future income flows produced by those technologies. To the extent that the
expenditure generates a risk-free rate of return (which is the cost to the
government of borrowing), the government breaks even on its tax
expenditure (neither a gain nor a loss in revenue). To see how this works,
16 See the 1995 Final Regulations, Allocations and Apportionment of Research and
Experimental Expenditures, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,502 (Dec. 22, 1995), Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17.
165 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 67.
166 See Martin A. Sullivan, Obama Chooses a Clumsy Way to Limit Deferral, 123 TAX
NOTES 1163, 1164 (2009).
167 Don Fullerton & Andrew B. Lyon, Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital, in 2 TAX
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assume that a taxpayer invests $100. Assume also a 35% corporate income
tax rate and a government rate for borrowing of 5%. Deducting the $100
expenditure results in a $35 tax savings to the taxpayer or $35 forgone
government revenue. Were the taxpayer to dispose of the technology one
year later for $105 (recouping its investment plus a 5% return), the taxpayer
would have $105 in income and a tax liability of $36.75. The government
breaks even because the present value of $36.75 at 5% paid one year later is
$35 today. Where those technologies are used to produce income which is
deferred, exempt, or included in foreign income thus increasing the foreign
tax credit limitation, the failure to allocate these deductions to that income
causes the government to lose twice-both its tax and its investment. To
illustrate, modify the first example by excluding the $105 received one year
later from income. The government relinquishes its claim to $35 in tax
revenue in year one and receives no taxes in year two. To see the
government's double hit, assume alternatively that the expenditure would
not have been originally deducted and the income would have been
included. In year one the government would have collected $35 in tax
($100 x .35). In year two the government would have collected $1.75 in tax
(105-100 (basis) = 5 income x 35%. The chart below compares the three
results in government revenue.
Income Taxed Income Taxed Income Not Taxed
Expenditures Not Deductible Expenditures Deductible Expenditures Deductible
Year 1 $35 <$35> <35>
Year 2 $1.75 36.75
Research and Development expenditures are not the only costs that can
contribute to the formation of intangible capital. General and
Administrative (G&A) expenditures which are , generally deductible costs
lead to the development of human capital including management,
production and sales efficiencies. Where G&A expenditure produces
intangible capital, the failure to allocate these expenditures to foreign
income creates the same problem as R&D. Even where the expenditure
only produces current income, however, the failure to allocate to a tax
favored source results in an understatement of U.S. taxable income.
The Obama proposal contains a direct solution to this problem. In
order to protect the domestic tax base and to increase revenue, which are
two of the three critical goals that international tax reform should advance,
appropriate potions of these expenditures would be allocated to foreign
income. Efficient rules of allocation are not easily obtainable due to the
complexity of determining how G&A should be allocated to foreign
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operations, since the evidence for appropriate attribution is uncertain.169 It
is suggested that the present rules for R&D are the result of a highly
contentious compromise between the government and taxpayers.170 This
compromise suggests that even if there were an optimum solution for G&A,
it might not be the best tax policy as any effort in this area conflicts with the
third goal of tax policy-promoting domestic growth and jobs.
A recent study by General Electric Corp. reached the following
conclusion: "No major country in the world denies deductions for domestic
expenses allocated to deferred or exempt foreign income."171 The national
considerations this statement indicates are important. Nations understand
the value that R&D and headquarters activity has to a nation by providing
jobs and investments and countless other positive externalities. 2In an
increasingly globalized economy, these activities are becoming more
mobile. At the same time, other countries look at them covetously because
they create significant local wealth and are thought not to compete
significantly with local business. Consequently, many nations use their tax
preferences and other incentives to entice these activities to their
countries. 73
The stakes are high. The tax implications are subtle and contradictory.
The United States starts with substantial incentives for the expenditures. To
the extent it reduces these incentives for foreign income, it makes foreign
development more attractive. To the extent the United States taxes all
intangible transfer, it also makes foreign development more attractive.
Finally, because the United States allows full deductibility for imported
goods and services, it also makes foreign production and development more
attractive.
Consequently, the unrestricted deductibility of G&A acts as a powerful
tax incentive for locating headquarters activity in the U.S. G&A reform
may be counterproductive. This is a reflection of the fact many
169 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN TAXATION (1995), reprinted in 95 TAX NOTES INT'L 101 (1995)
(referring to the uncertainty of the evidence for accurate R&D allocation).
170 See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 771.
171 Parillo, supra note 151, at 1389. In the case of R&D, the United States allocates a
portion of the expenditures to foreign income of U.S. taxpayers. This results in a decrease in
the foreign tax credit limitation under I.R.C. § 904. Where a corporation is in an excess
credit position, this results in the practical equivalent of a denial of the deduction.
172 TANZI, supra note 66, at 35; Assaf Razin & Chi-Wa Yuen, Understanding the
"Problem of Economic Development": The Role of Factor Mobility and International
Taxation (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7115, 1999), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7115.pdf.
1n See EASSON, supra note 49, at 80-81. See also Communication from the Commission
to the Council, Toward Tax Coordination in the European Union, A Package to Tackle
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theoretically reasonable and just reforms cannot hope to satisfy the policy
goals of taxation in a world of extreme tax competition for the mobile
factors of production.
B. Changing Course: Ending Deferral: Comprehensive Income Taxation
A change in course is needed. Most countries are no longer following
the lead of the United States in international tax matters. Today, most
nations are adopting exclusion for foreign business income. Three
prominent scholars have suggested instead, however, that the solution is to
adopt a fully rigorous scheme for the worldwide taxation of corporate
income.
As Fleming, Peroni, and Shay have so aptly said, ... worldwide
taxation should be regarded as the benchmark of neutrality and that
territorial taxation should be viewed as the distortive approach."l 74 This
view is founded on a perception of the consequences of the CEN approach
to neutrality or economic efficiency.'7 5 - Part IV(A) of this work
demonstrates that CEN is the critical economic concept to issues of
international taxation. But CEN is limited. Though CEN is the optimal
theory of neutrality in a world of tax competition, 6 it is a theory of the
efficient taxation of capital income, not business income. Once one
concedes that business income is the product of factors other than capital
(or the normal return from capital), theories of efficient capital allocation
are no longer completely authoritative. Instead, economic efficiency
requires a different principle of tax neutrality to provide for the non-
distortive allocation of business activity worldwide.
In addition, the case for the worldwide taxation model takes the
perspective of the American government and its taxpayers; the objective is
that worldwide taxation should create equality among resident taxpayers. 7
This approach is negated by the need to provide double taxation relief in
fairness to taxpayers. It is counterbalanced by the opposing equity of
nations within which business activity occurs. Source countries can
reasonably conclude that business income, attributed to value added to the
world by reason of the special benefits conferred by that country, should be
exclusively taxed by the source country.' 78  Since economic rents are
related to the benefits received from the source country, worldwide taxation
of such rents is one nation poaching on the natural tax base of the other and
174 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra, note 90, at 1088.
"7 Id. at 1088 n.I10.
176 See, e.g.., Razin & Sudka, supra note 59, at 75; Barker, supra note 18, at 192.
" See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 90, at 1091-94.
178 For example, emerging economies often require tax sparing or exemption before they
enter into treaties with developed countries. See OECD, TAX SPARING, supra note 104, at
19-20.
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restricts the exercise of that country's tax sovereignty. 179
A solution needs to address the different requirements of fairness. The
fundamental attitude implied by worldwide taxation is that a resident
country is fully entitled to a full tax modified only by considerations of
fairness to the taxpayer. Considerations of equity toward the source
country should at least give the U.S. pause as to the justice of this claim. It
should encourage the U.S. to consider that it may be appropriate for its
claim to give way to the principle that the country that is the source of the
value that produces the income should have the exclusive right to tax it. s0
Different international approaches based on different views on
efficiency and justice lead to conflict among nations. This necessarily
limits the choices of nations proceeding unilaterally. Comprehensive
taxation without deferral, which is based on many of the same fundamental
principles and perceptions as the present system, cannot address the
problems of the present system. There are several reasons for this.
One reason is that comprehensive taxation without deferral still
depends on the niceties of source rules. Income taxation cannot provide an
adequate solution without some kind of consensus among nations based on
a recognition of a more economically-based connection between the income
and the territory. Since territorial allocation of income and deduction is still
critical for application of foreign tax credits, transfer pricing planning will
remain an important aspect leading to the distortion of source. Because
foreign tax credits will become the principal offset to current taxation, cross
crediting and the incentive to locate real or apparent activity or capital by
multinationals will remain strong.
Worldwide taxation must, however, pass a different kind of reality
check, that is, its realistic chance of promoting good policies. Fleming,
Peroni, and Shay argue that the evidence does not support the conclusion
that U.S. multinationals are currently at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-
vis those of other countries.'81  Though the conclusion may be correct at
present, the conclusion does not follow that these corporations would not be
at a disadvantage if the ineffectual current system were replaced with a
system that raised substantial revenue from foreign sources.
Comprehensive taxation would discourage the formation of new business in
America, other than those activities that need close proximity to American
markets. Compared with the present system, it would discourage R&D and
179 Barker, supra note 12, at 388.
180 This is Value Export Neutrality and Value Import Neutrality, which reconciles the
claims of resident and source countries by adherence to the principal of CEN, the exchange
theory of source taxation, and equitable reconciliation of conflicting claims of fairness. See
Barker, supra note 16, at 202.
'1 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 90, at 1101-02. (citing the lack of evidence on
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G&A activities in America. There would be considerable pressure on
existing businesses to change their residence eliminating taxation of their
foreign operations and their domestic operations to the extent these
depended on highly mobile factors of production. In a world where most
countries adopt a type of foreign territorial exemption system,1 82 increased
U.S. taxation would have to have a huge impact on locational decisions. If
existing companies actually could not avoid the costs, there could very well
be a decline in U.S. competitiveness even at home. Ultimately, little
revenue might be raised over the long run.
C. Changing Course: Comprehensive Income Taxation with Exemption of
Foreign Active Business Income
With the recent addition of the United Kingdom and Japan to the ranks
of those countries that adopt some form of exclusion for foreign business
earnings,' the United States now finds itself as the principal proponent of
worldwide taxation. 184 In general, under an exemption system, the active
business income of a resident-owned foreign corporation, and in cases of
countries like Australia, Canada, France and Germany, resident-owned
foreign branches, 85 is not taxed in the resident country either when it is
earned or when it is repatriated as a dividend. Exemption is granted for
active business income only; exemption is not granted for passive income-
that is, rents, royalties, and interest.186
Exemption systems are thought to promote the competitiveness of
resident companies internationally, to promote the simplification of tax
administration by eliminating foreign tax credits for exempt income, and to
promote a domestic tax base that is protected from erosion. 187 Yet the
evidence strongly suggests that income exemption systems are largely
subject to the same level of difficulty in accomplishing its taxation goals as
is the case of worldwide taxation with deferral.1  This is because
exemption presents similar compliance risks as deferral systems because
both systems must segregate appropriately exempt or deferred income. In
both cases active business income is preferenced income.
Exemption countries use different criteria to qualify foreign-source
182 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE,
U.S. SENATE, GAO-09-934 INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: STUDY COUNTRIES THAT EXEMPT
FOREIGN-SOURCED INCOME FACE COMPLIANCE RISKS AND BURDENS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE




186 Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 83, at 774-75.
117 See, e.g., U.S. Treas. Dep't, International Tax Reform: An Interim Report, 1993 TAX
NOTES 15 (1993); Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 83, at 772-73.
188 GAO REPORT, supra note 182, at 18.
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dividends for exemption.189 Ownership percentages are used to distinguish
between dividends and returns that are considered to be essentially business
profits and those that are investments. Type of income requirements for
exemption reflect the need to examine the underlying foreign income to
determine whether the dividend paid out of that income should be afforded
active (exempt) or passive (taxed) status. Finally, exemption may be
designed to be fully operative only in the case where there are tax treaties
between the two countries or the source country imposes a significant rate
of tax. 190 The consequence is that the old system of taxation with foreign
tax credits would still apply to some of taxpayers' operations in tandem
with territorial exclusion.
To address the problem of tax-motivated locational decisions and the
unwarranted shifting of net income from nonexempt to exempt income,
many countries adopting exemption still have significant anti-avoidance
rules.' 91 These include Controlled Foreign Corporation ("CFC") legislation
that is similar to or at least share the same objective as Subpart F of the U.S.
tax law.192 In both the deferral and exemption systems, CFC legislation
generally taxes resident shareholders on some of the income that is not
deemed to be appropriate for deferral or exemption, including passive
sources and business income that may be located in particular countries for
tax-motivated purposes.
Though in theory foreign tax credits present less of a problem in an
exemption system because they are unnecessary for exempt business
income,193 distinctions between active non-creditable income and passive
creditable income continue to create opportunities for the same types of
planning found in deferral systems, such as the transformation of interest
royalties and other forms of income into exempt (or deferred) income, or
the transformation of high taxed active income into passive income for
194crediting purposes.
Domestic expense deductions related to foreign income also present a
problem for exemption systems. It is generally recognized that it is
extremely difficult and potentially ineffective to attempt to allocate indirect
expenses like R&D and G&A to foreign income. 9 5 Allocating G&A has
' Id. at 11.
190 Id. See also H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom Up: Taxing the Income of
Foreign Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1525, 1544 (2001) (suggesting that
exemption should be limited to foreign corporations operating in countries that impose
significant taxation).
191 GAO REPORT, supra note 182, at 23-24.
192 Id. at 14. See also I.R.C. § 954.
193 GAO REPORT, supra note 182, at 25.
19 4 Id. at 23, 25, 27.
'9 Id. at 28.
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not been tried, even in the United States. 196 Consequently, countries such
as Germany and France attempt only rough justice by requiring that 5% of
exempt dividends be added into the domestic tax base when repatriated. 9 7
A 5% inclusion can have little relation to the amount of the current
deduction of G&A and R&D associated with this income and the effect of
postponement of the tax until dividends are repatriated.
The experience of France, Germany, Canada, Australia, and the
Netherlands, supports the conclusion that exemption countries faced the
same degree of compliance risk and taxpayer compliance burden as found
under the American deferral system. 198 In particular, governments adopting
territorial exemption stated that "transfer pricing was the most significant
risk they faced in the area of international taxation."'99 Complying with
transfer pricing rules is also one of the most burdensome parts of
international tax compliance. 200 Exemption systems still face significant
risk in regard to segregating income between exempt and taxable subject to
foreign tax credits and to the allocation of deductions to foreign exempt
income, all problems associated with deferral. 20 1 They also depend on
protective anti-abuse measures.
Considering administrative feasibility and compliance issues, an
exemption system may be an improvement over the present system of
deferral. However, defects closely approximating those found in a deferral
system remain. Consequently, the theoretical prediction that an exemption
system for the United States would increase revenue might be exaggerated
because exemption is subject to the same kinds of manipulation as the
present system.
In addition, there is a more fundamental economic reason why
exemption systems are not much more effective than deferral systems.
Exemption systems are predicated on the principle of capital import
neutrality. The only tax is the source country tax. Deferral systems can
have the same practical result where income earned by a controlled foreign
196 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 67 (setting forth the current proposal
that would require the allocation of G&A to foreign income).
197 Id.
'9' Id. at 3.
'" Id. at 19.
200 For a thorough study of the significance of compliance costs in regard to international
activities, see Marsha Blumenthal & Joel B. Slemrod, The Compliance Cost of Taxing
Foreign-Source Income: Its Magnitude, Determinants, and Policy Implications, 2 INT'L TAX
AND PUB. FIN. 37 (1995) (study showing that 40% of the compliance costs of U.S.
multinationals were attributed to taxation of foreign source income even though only 20% of
these multinationals' economic activities were in foreign operations). See also Robert J.
Peroni, Deferral of US. Tax on International Income: End It, Don't Mend It-Why Should
We Be Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1609 (2001).
201 GAO REPORT, supra note 182, at 23, 25, 26, 27, 28.
684
International Tax Reform Should Begin at Home
30:647 (2010)
corporation is deferred for a substantial period of time.
To be accurate, exemption and deferral are CIN applications only to a
certain extent. That is, to the extent that foreign business income represents
the normal return on equity capital, its exemption or deferral produces the
efficiencies of CIN which require the exclusive taxation of income from
capital by the source country.
Underlying these rules is a critical dichotomy. Capital return that is
classified as debt is passive and is subject to tax. Capital return that is
equity is active and is tax-preferred. Debt follows CEN principles of
neutrality. Equity follows CIN principles of neutrality. Where taxpayers
have flexibility and choice as to form, the regime is elective. Where the
regime is elective, the results reflect taxpayer savings and not efficient
principles of capital allocation among capital exporting and capital
importing nations.
The present system reflects this inconsistency. Multinationals choose
debt financing to the extent possible in high tax countries because interest is
deductible, and equity capital in low tax countries in order to accumulate
income and defer the tax on that income. Even where debt is used, the
return on debt financing is not necessarily taxed by the United States
because debt is often held by offshore financial subsidiaries in a way that
prevents effective tax.
The failure to tax domestic and exported capital in all of its forms alike
in a world of fierce tax competition is a ticket for disaster. Capital and
business will tend to flow from countries like the United States to any place
where the after-tax return is greater. Many countries subsidize
multinationals by providing tax preferences and low rates of tax. Thus,
both deferral and income exemption guarantee that which countries most
fear-that the absence of effective source tax will exert a strong influence
on locational decisions.202
This is not the way these systems are supposed to work. International
taxation principle assumes general taxation of capital and business income
by source countries.2 03 Actual international practice does not follow theory.
One reason is the developed world pushes source countries to exempt or
greatly reduce the rate on most forms of direct capital income including
interest, royalties, and dividends.204 Developed countries adopt this
principle by unilaterally exempting the income from debt held by
nonresidents.
A second reason is competition among nations for foreign business
requires emerging economies to provide tax incentives to multinationals.
202 See OECD, TAX SPARING, supra note 104.
203 Barker, supra note 12, at 377.
204 See Articles of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Art. 11
(2003) (proposing international norm of little or no source tax on capital income).
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Lower foreign taxes produce a powerful incentive to locate business
activities outside the resident countries, with a consequent loss of jobs and
value to the home state.205
D. Changing Course: Comprehensive Income Taxation with an Exemption
for Real Profits from Foreign Business Activity (Real Profits equal net
(positive) cash flow from business activity)
The first step toward sensible international tax principles is the
acknowledgment of the realities of source taxation. The emphasis should
be on a fair and efficient strategy for the source taxation of business income
in accordance with practical constraints.
There is an optimal system for the source taxation of business
activities. Since source countries may truly lack the power and the
economic justification for taxing the normal return from capital, they should
not tax it. The tax base for the source taxation of active business income
that is economically justified is economic rents. A tax on economic rents,
which can be implemented by a source country through an expenditure or
broad-based cash flow tax, 6 exempts the normal return from capital.
Principles of fairness to taxpayers require that resident states provide
double taxation relief. Principles of fairness between nations would dictate
that double taxation relief provided by the home state would only need be
afforded to economic rents. The income from equity capital would be
included in the resident's tax base without any need for double taxation
relief.
The fact is that economic rents is the natural, economically neutral tax
base for source taxation which strongly reflects the exchange principle of
fair taxation. Economic rents is a perfect base for exclusion as a method of
double taxation relief because the source country has a much stronger
economic justification for exclusive taxation than it did for active business
income. Exemption, contrasted with comprehensive tax of economic rents
with credit system, would be a rational response to the considerations of
fairness to source countries.
Though an expenditure tax is the model for source taxation of
economic rents, it would be difficult to blend a general income tax with an
exclusion based on an expenditure tax model. Thus, exemption for
economic rents could be implemented by the resident country more easily
by starting with the previous model for the exemption of active business
income. Modifications would be required for the current taxation of the
normal return from capital. This could be implemented by imputing an
205 See Barker, supra note 16, at 195-97 (describing the consequence of capital flight).
206 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for
Income Taxes as the International Norm, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 145, 145 (1992). See also Barker,
supra note 16, at 212-14; Barker, supra note 12, at 382.
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interest payment from the foreign enterprise to its domestic parent as a
charge for the use of all equity capital used by the enterprise.207
Comprehensive taxation with the exemption of foreign economic rents
deals directly with many of the defects of the present system. It cures the
undesirable consequence of little or no taxation of equity income. It
provides a backup to the current taxation of rents, royalties, and interest by
taxing equity capital. It would virtually eliminate the advantage of
mischaracterizing or is-sourcing income or expenses. The tax incentive
will be much less for transforming interest and royalties into equity return;
it will take some pressure off the foreign tax credit system, especially the
problem of cross-crediting. Compared with comprehensive taxation
without deferral, it substantially reduces the need for foreign tax credits that
depend on transfer pricing rules, sourcing rules, debt-equity distinctions,
intangible asset/business income distinctions, and financial service income
characterized as cross-crediting.
Implementation of exemption for economic rents faces certain
challenges. First, all equity capital must be valued in order to impute an
appropriate return. Transfer pricing would be an important concern.
Second, exclusion for economic rents puts pressure on the somewhat
arbitrary selection of the imputed return rate included in the domestic base
for the normal return on equity capital.
The exemption for foreign economic rents deserves strong
consideration as a vastly improved solution to the present system. The
system is based on sound economic principles, it accomplishes fundamental
fairness to the United States, its taxpayers, and to foreign governments, and
it should simplify administration and compliance. In all, it should aid U.S.
multinational competitiveness.
Exemption for foreign economic rents is the best solution considered
so far, but it still has its disadvantages making it susceptible to
manipulation.
VII. A RADICAL PARADIGM SHIFT: REPLACING THE CORPORATE
INCOME TAX WITH A TERRITORIAL EXPENDITURE TAX
The present focus of tax reform is on the foreign element of a resident
taxpayer's affairs. International tax law is also about defining and
protecting the domestic tax base from erosion due to residents' and non-
residents' foreign activities. A simple fact of international taxation is that a
resident of one country is a non-resident of others. Consequently, one
person's activities reflect a complex relation between different nations' tax
207 The rate for the normal return from capital to be used for the interest rate must be a
judgment call. In a different context, The American Law Institute chose a rate that was 2%
above the U.S. Treasury debt risk-free rate of return. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAx PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C, REPORTER'S STUDY DRAFT 88-97 (1989)
(proposal to allow corporations an interest-like deduction on new equity).
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bases. Reform requires identifying and resolving the conflicting claims to
these tax bases. International tax reform would advance if it focused on the
relation of a U.S. corporation's foreign income and enterprises with its
domestic activities, and on the relation of a foreign corporation's foreign
activities to its U.S. activities. The common denominator is territorial
taxation.
Territorial taxation of any corporation is 2 ustified on the basis of
benefit received from the taxing jurisdiction.20  Since the concept of
corporate resident lacks sufficient social, political, or economic support,
international tax law should put to the side corporate taxation in accordance
with ability to pay and residence and should start instead with a supportable
rationale for corporate taxation-benefit received. International tax reform
would be founded on a universal assumption: all corporations are
appropriately taxed in accordance with territorial principles.
Territorial taxation of nonresidents has not worked well under an
income tax system plagued by the same types of problems outlined above
for resident taxation of foreign income.20 9 Source plays a critical role in the
taxation of nonresidents, and the present source rules fail to reflect an
economic justification for taxation. 210  Since many of the factors of
production of enterprises are mobile and can be used in various locations,
the physical location of business on account of tax incentives is inefficient.
Consequently, some countries granting incentives may not even receive in
taxes the value of public goods and services provided to corporations.2 1 1
There are, however, other factors of production found in a nation that are
sufficient to attract and retain economic activities. It is these national
endowments that benefit economic activity that form the justification for
-212territorial tax.
Once the taxpayer-supplied factors of production are accounted for
through deduction of these costs from the tax base, it is reasonable to
conclude that these "benefits" of a national system make it possible to
realize this true net profit. Economic rents are the one clear basis for
territorial taxation over which all countries, including developing countries,
208 See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
209 See Part II.A. supra (outlining principle problems with the present system).
210 Sophisticated planning today exploits weaknesses in the U.S. system by taking
advantage of "(1) the evolution of economic activity in the developed world toward value-
added services and intangible assets, (2) increased flexibility in locating tangible economic
functions and intangible assets, (3) technological and communications advances that
challenge the ability of countries to impose tax at source, (4) substantial innovations in the
structuring of financial assets, (5) the continued availability of low-tax countries that
sometimes erect enforcement obstacles in the form of confidentiality restrictions." Shay,
Fleming & Peroni, supra note 74, at 84-85 (citations omitted).
211 In general, governments should recover from firms the costs of providing public
goods and services to them. See Wilson & Wildasin, supra note 68.
212 See id.; Barker, supra note 16, at 212-16.
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have real taxing power. Thus, the United States should start with the most
justifiable base for the taxation of all corporations, a territorial tax on rents.
An income tax on economic rents can be implemented by a business
213
expenditure, cash flow, or consumption tax. One way of looking at the
essential difference between an income tax and an expenditure tax is that an
income tax taxes the entire return including the return on capital. An
expenditure tax does not tax the normal return on capital. Income tax
permits a deduction for interest on debt capital only, whereas an
expenditure tax removes the normal return on all capital from the tax base.
Thus, an income tax that would allow a deduction for all capital costs, both
debt and equity, would be equivalent to a tax on economic rents.
Expenditure taxes follow two designs. The basic model (R-type) starts
with a comprehensive income tax base and allows immediate deduction for
the cost of materials, labor, and fixed assets.2 14 It differs from an income
tax in that income taxes require the capitalization of expenditures that
produce future value and thereafter allow a deduction for that cost over time
through depreciation. Under an R-type, dividends and interest are not
taxed, and interest payments are not deductible.
The second expenditure tax design is an R&F-type. Under an income
tax, interest receipts are included in income and interest payments are
deductible. Under an R&F-type expenditure tax, the treatment of financial
instruments is changed. Interest, dividends, and the principle amount of
loans are included in the tax base; interest, dividends and principle
payments are deducted from the tax base.2 15 The R&F is the superior
solution for assessing financial businesses and transactions because there is
no need to separate capital income and expenditures from noncapital.2 16
Expenditure or consumption taxes are territorially based. One reason
is that the philosophical underpinnings of consumption tax theory have
been based on linking the tax base to a country, which is an in rem or
territorial concept. To Thomas Hobbes, one of the earliest theorists of
consumption taxation, the only fair and equitable tax was a consumption
tax.217 Hobbes focus was on people; an individual is taxed on what she
takes out of a system, rather than what she adds. Consumption is linked to
benefit. Thus, where benefits-received is the justification, territorial tax is
the norm. Expenditure tax design aims at a national tax base that belongs to
213 See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME As
A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLIcy 50 (1938) (stating that consumption equals income less
savings or plus dissavings).
214 See THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT
TAXATION 230-31 (1978). The allowance of a deduction for labor is what distinguishes an
expenditure tax from another kind of consumption tax, the Value Added Tax.
215 Id. at 233.
2161 d. at 213-14.
217 THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 158 (George Routledge and Sons 1887).
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that nation and no other.
Businesses do not technically consume, but their tax obligations can be
measured in terms of a consumption or cash flow base. For a corporation,
the tax base is what is available for consumption-that is, the cash flow that
remains when all expenditures are accounted for. If applied universally,
cash flow would be measured by all receipts and disbursements worldwide.
When applied territorially, receipts and disbursements must be segregated
and assigned to a territory.
There are two general schemes for defining the territorial attributes of
an expenditure tax base. These are the origin principle and the destination
principle.2 18 Though there is much overlap in practical results, the two
principles approach the tax base design from different perspectives.
A. The Origin Principle
The origin principle is about indentifying the value created within a
territory after the normal cost of capital has been removed. It begins with
inflows that include the total income from the sales of all goods and
services in the United States. It also includes export sales of goods and
services plus all other exported value. Outflows, or deductions, include all
expenditures for goods and services and productive assets, whether
produced domestically or imported.2 19
An origin-based expenditure tax is analogous to our current income tax
system differing only in its treatment of tax of the normal return from
capital. Both tax bases reflect the net value produced by a taxpayer. They
differ in that a comprehensive income tax would tax the value produced
worldwide by a resident taxpayer, whereas origin-based expenditure tax
only taxes the value produced by the taxpayer within the territory of the
United States. Where a taxpayer uses a foreign corporation for foreign
production, comprehensive income taxation with deferral adopts an origin
principle reaching only U.S. production currently.
The origin principle theoretically accomplishes much of what an
optimal tax in the international setting should do. It should raise revenue in
a simpler, less complicated fashion that eliminates the distinction between
debt and equity. When it is applied solely to corporations, it leaves taxation
of capital income to "human" persons who can be taxed as residents on a
progressive basis.220 It identifies an economically justifiable base for
218 Modem proposals, like the Flat Tax, are origin based expenditure taxes. See ROBERT
E. HALL & ALvIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (1995). An example of a consumption tax that
is not a cash flow tax but that follows the destination principle is a European-style value
added tax. See CHARLEs E. McCLURE, JR., THE VALUE-ADDED TAx: KEY To DEFICIT
REDUCTION? (1987).
219 See David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REv. 599, 618-19
(2000).
220 The replacement of the income tax on corporations with an expenditure tax on
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source taxation-the value that a nation has added to the world, which
consists of the economic rents made possible by that system. 2 2 1 It exempts
economic rents that are attributable to value derived from other nations.
One major advantage of a territorial expenditure tax is that it
completely eliminates the need for foreign tax credits. The territorial tax
base belongs to that nation. All income from foreign production is
excluded from the tax base. From the point of view of the country of
origin, its right to tax is primary and any other nation's taxation of the same
base would be secondary. An advantage of all expenditure taxes is that they
eliminate the distinction between capital income and other forms of income
since it eliminates the tax on capital income through expensing capital
expenditures and it treats all receipts the same.222
However, the similarity of the origin principle to comprehensive
income taxation causes it to share many of income tax's defects in the
international setting. The origin principle as applied to corporations would
be open internationally.223 Deductions and inclusions taken by one U.S.
taxpayer would not, in respect of imports and exports, be reflected by other
U.S. taxpayers as, respectively, inclusions and deductions. Open systems
foster tax avoidance. Most imports to the United States come through
related party transactions either involving controlled foreign corporations of
U.S. multinationals or involving U.S. affiliates of foreign multinationals. 224
The cost of these imports in an origin base expenditure tax is deducted
against U.S. tax liability. In addition, imports of services and tangible and
intangible capital is fully deducted under an origin-based expenditure tax.
The true net profit derived from imports is not taxed by the importing state.
Transfer pricing abuse resulting from inflated pricing would be a significant
risk for importing countries implementing an origin-based expenditure tax.
Exports represent an analogous problem. The vast majority of exports
from the United States involve related party transactions. 25 The origin-
based expenditure tax requires the taxation of all exports, including exports
of goods, services, tangible and intangible capital. The tax base includes
the value of exports on the basis of actual sales or notional sales for value if
exports are transferred at no cost to a related entity. The true net profit from
exports is taxed by the exporting state. Transfer pricing abuse, resulting
from deflated pricing, would be a significant risk for exporting countries
implementing an origin-based expenditure tax.
The origin-based expenditure tax has many advantages. It puts
taxation of corporations on a fair, economically-sound basis. It
corporations would eliminate the double taxation of capital income.
221 See supra Part IV.D.
222 See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 218, at 60-64, 72.
223 See Weisbach, supra note 219, at 601.
224 Zeile, supra note 4, at 208.
225 Id. at 209.
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substantially reduces the complexity of compliance and administration.
The system has an important advantage to corporations: the exemption for
the normal income return from capital, which could help make it politically
feasible. On balance, it cures many of the critical defects of the present
system. However, its revenue raising potential could be undermined by
transfer pricing abuse. Since transfer pricing would be the focal point for
effective taxation, the government would likely focus its efforts in the
transfer pricing area.
An important negative result of the origin-based expenditure tax is that
it does not achieve all of the policy goals that an international tax system
should achieve. Though it chooses an economically neutral and
internationally equitable domestic tax base, it could promote outcomes that
are dramatically opposed to the goals of creating American jobs and
spurring domestic development. First, since imports are deductible, foreign
production even by U.S. multinationals is favored because there is no tax on
foreign production, even foreign production resulting in U.S. sales. It might
also give a substantial advantage in the United States to foreign
multinationals that follow the typical pattern of foreign production leaving
distribution activities as the primary activity performed in the United
States.226
Export taxation has an equally undesirable effect. It would
disincentivize domestic production for non-U.S. markets. It would
certainly discourage foreign multinationals from production in the United
States and this could be a serious threat to the continuation of the significant
contribution to exports of the U.S. affiliates of foreign multinationals. 227 It
would create a strong incentive for U.S. multinationals to relocate their
production overseas where tangible and intangible asset values could be
shifted through non-arm's length transfer pricing. R&D and G&A activity
in the United States would also experience extra costs because all value
exported must be taxed (because all value created domestically would be
deducted). Of course, R&D and G&A performed outside the U.S. would
not be deductible, but foreign income would not be taxable. Since imports
would be deductible, the income resulting from foreign R&D and G&A
expenditures would never be included in the U.S. tax base. Significant tax
planning would still be important for multinationals.
B. The Destination Principle
The destination principle changes the fundamental object of an
expenditure tax. While the origin principle taxes the value which a national
territory has added to the world, the destination principle taxes the value
226 Id. at 208.
227 U.S. affiliates of foreign multinationals account for 20% of total U.S. exports of
goods. Id.
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which a nation has taken out of the world. The destination principle
adheres directly to its consumption-based roots.
The destination principle begins with all dispositions of goods and
services that are made for U.S. consumption. It permits deduction for all
expenditures for goods and services produced in the United States. 2 28 All
dispositions are included except for exports; all expenditures are deducted
except for imports.
Under the origin principle, taxing exports and deducting imports
results in a tax on all production occurring within the United States, a tax on
value added by the U.S. system to the world. Under the destination
principle, exempting exports and ignoring imports results in a tax on
production consumed in the United States no matter where that production
originated.
A cash flow destination expenditure tax includes all dispositions in the
tax base except for exports from the United States. Exports include all
exported goods, services and capital. The costs associated with exported
U.S. production are deductible, however. This would include domestically
incurred R&D and G&A costs.229 Imports of whatever kind are tax-
irrelevant, since the costs associated with imported value are not deducted.
Since the value of imports is not excluded from the tax base by deduction, it
is effectively taxed.23
Cash flow taxes share many features. Like the origin principle, the
destination principle raises taxes in a simpler fashion that eliminates the
distinction between debt and equity. When applied solely to corporations, it
leaves the taxation of capital income to "human" persons who can be taxed
as residents on a progressive basis. Like the origin principle, the
destination principle identifies an economically justifiable base for source
taxation. Unlike the origin principle, the destination principle's tax base is
the value that nation has taken from the world, which consists of the
economic rents consumed by that nation. The destination principle exempts
the economic rents that are consumed elsewhere.
As a cash flow tax, the destination principle also eliminates the need
for foreign tax credits. The tax base of domestic consumption belongs
primarily to the consuming nation. All foreign consumption is excluded
from the tax base. Since the primary right to tax domestic consumption
belongs to the source country, there can be no acceptable double taxation of
income that would require relief from the point of view of the country of
destination.
228 See Weisbach, supra note 219, at 620.
229 Interest is deducible only under a cash flow, R&F, system. R models ignore both
interest receipts and interest payments.
230 Since the sale of those imports to U.S. consumers is included in the tax base, and no
deduction is allowed for the cost of those imports, the full value of imports is taxed. This
includes the costs as well as the profits from those imports.
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There is an important difference in effect, however, between an origin
and a destination-style consumption tax. In its focus on U.S. production,
the origin principle establishes a system that is quite similar in operation to
our present income tax system. In its focus on U.S. consumption, however,
the destination principle establishes a system that in some critical respects is
different in operation to our present system and an origin expenditure tax.
While the origin principle thus shares some of the defects of the present
system, principally the problem of cross-border adjustments, which leads to
the critical risk of transfer pricing abuse, the destination principle does not.
A major advantage of the destination principle is that it is closed
internationally.231 All deductible expenditures end up as taxable receipts to
a U.S. taxpayer. Non-corporate taxpayers include these receipts for income
tax purposes; corporate taxpayers include them for expenditure tax
purposes. Expenditures for imports are not deductible, nor are they
included as receipts in the income of any U.S. taxpayer. Consequently, the
pricing of imports and transfer pricing issues are irrelevant under the
destination principle.
There is the same kind of advantage with respect to exports under a
destination principle. Exports are not included in the base, nor are
purchasers permitted to deduct these amounts from the U.S. tax base.
Exports are not taxed because they represent potential consumption by
another system. Imports are taxed (in essence, because they are not
deductible) because they represent consumption by the U.S. system. Thus,
the major advantage of the destination principle is that it has eliminated the
tax significance of cross border transfer pricing. Neither overcharging for
imports nor undercharging for exports has any tax utility.
The destination principle also cures the problem of transforming
interest and royalties into exempt or deferred income. An expenditure tax
does this by allowing deductions for all outputs and taxing all inputs
(assuming the R&F model). This accomplishes the abolition of the
distinctions among all types of income. Because capital expenditures are
immediately deducted, the value that capital creates shows up as inflows
(such as sales, rents, royalties, etc.). To the extent that the inflows are U.S.
sales, this value is included. To the extent the value is from exports, it is
excluded.
Unlike any other system considered, the destination principle has no
need to allocate domestic expenditures to foreign income. That is because
domestic expenditures are created-value, not consumed-value.
Consequently, they are appropriately deducted in their entirety from a tax
base that targets consumed value.
The key to effective taxation is the creation of an unavoidable tax.
This is especially true where income producing events have an international
231 See Weisbach, supra note 219, at 620.
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dimension. The destination principle eliminates the reason for cross-border
pricing strategies because neither exports nor imports are included in the tax
base. Eliminating transfer pricing issues makes the destination expenditure
tax a highly unavoidable tax.
Financial services are handled in a different way. An R-model, which
is a yield-exempt model, is an awkward model for capturing the service
component or true net profit of financial services. An R&F model, on the
other hand, is an accurate way of doing so because it records all cash flows
including financial ones. It automatically excludes the normal return on
capital leaving the rents to be taxed. It is the preferred model for all
corporations because it would eliminate any distinctions between business
and capital income.13 1
Every system previously considered has defects that have a profound
effect on locational decisions. These systems do not achieve tax neutrality.
The elimination of virtually all of these problems by the destination
expenditure model has moved taxation to a neutral factor in locational
decisions. Legislators can be confident that the destination principle creates
a corporate tax base that accomplishes the twin goals of establishing and
preserving the U.S. domestic tax base for both U.S. and foreign
multinationals.
This base does more, however. The destination principle taxes in a
manner that enhances growth and business activity domestically. By
permitting taxpayers to deduct expenditures for all production in the United
States, no matter whether it results in domestic sales (taxable income) or
exports (nontaxable income), it promotes the production of goods and
services, the location of research and development, and the location of
headquarters and administration in the United States. If anything could
reverse the flow of jobs and business activity outside the United States, a
destination expenditure tax would.
No tax is immune from fraud, however. Though it cures the problems
associated with tax planning and avoidance, it provides predictable avenues
for evasion. Because exports are not taxable, there will be the temptation to
recharacterize sales to Americans as exports. Since imports are not
deductible, there will be the temptation to recharacterize foreign production
as domestic. In the case of direct imports to consumers, a destination
principle requires sophisticated border supervision. The problems of
evasion do not appear, however, to be greater than under the alternatives
considered, whereas the problems of avoidance under a destination
expenditure tax are substantially eliminated.233
Different factors affect production activity. Obviously, a considerable
232 See id. at 624.
233 Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., A Note on Patterns of Production and Employment by U.S.
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amount of the production is still located in the United States based on
export figures. A considerable amount of production is also undertaken by
foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals that is destined for countries other
than where produced. Some of this production ends up as U.S. imports. It
is logical that this production is accounted for, at least in large part, by
capital and technologies developed in the United States. A destination
expenditure tax captures this repatriated value by denying a deduction for
imports.
A destination type expenditure tax reverses traditional notions of
planning for taxes both for U.S. and foreign multinationals. There is no tax
advantage to production abroad. Indeed, production for domestic markets
is fully taxed only where the production occurred outside the United States.
Production for foreign markets is not taxed at all. Consequently, all costs of
U.S. production wherever destined would be fully deducted. Income tax
systems of other countries would not match the incentivizing effect on
business. This system would encourage all multinationals to produce in
America for domestic consumption. Moreover, America would offer
multinationals a favorable tax environment for the production of exports.
Consequently, a destination expenditure tax is both tax neutral and
growth enhancing. It places all foreign production on a level playing field
with respect to domestic consumption. It places all domestic production on
a level playing field with two different dimensions. The first dimension is
domestic production for domestic consumption. Because only domestic
production is deductible, a destination tax promotes U.S. production. The
second dimension is domestic production for exports. Since all domestic
expenditures are deductible, domestic production for export results in a
negative tax on exports which reduces U.S. tax liability.
CONCLUSION
The present international tax system is riddled with problems because
it does not satisfy principles of economics, justice, or common sense. The
literature contains many solutions to the present system, from incremental
reform to radical reform. This paper has examined several of these
proposals, including comprehensive income taxation with exemption for
foreign active business income, comprehensive income taxation without
deferral, and comprehensive income taxation with exemption for foreign
economic rents. The analysis has shown that a territorial income exemption
system does little to address the defects in the present system and errs in
relying on outmoded theories of economic efficiency. The analysis shows
that comprehensive income taxation, though it is based on a better
understanding of economic principles, shares many of the defects of the
present system. The analysis shows that the third model, territorial
exemption of economic rents for corporations, best exemplifies sound
economic principles of neutrality, and addresses many more of the defects
of the present system. Though exemption for foreign economic rents
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presents the best economic model for reform, adoption would still present
some opportunities for tax avoidance. None of these systems, however,
advance the goal of promoting U.S. job and economic development in the
United States.
This paper then considers a paradigm change: the replacement of the
corporate income tax with an expenditure tax. What is different about this
proposal from other consumption tax proposals is that it is designed solely
as a replacement for the corporate income tax. This proposal is advanced
because it promotes fair and efficient U.S. international tax rules for
corporations. An expenditure tax model changes the focus from the
difficult task of taxing foreign income to the more practical task of taxing
the domestic income of all corporations well. Of the two expenditure tax
models, the origin principle, by focusing on U.S. production, still shares
some of the defects of most international income tax systems and shares the
inability of income tax systems to promote domestic growth and welfare.
The destination principle expenditure tax, however, is so different in its
fundamental conception that it does not share the defects of the present
system. It taxes in a way that should promote long-term revenue gains,
protect the domestic tax base, and, at the same time, stimulate economic
growth in U.S. jobs and business in a tax neutral fashion. The destination
principle creates an efficient, fair, largely unavoidable tax that would
enhance U.S. welfare, a clearly superior solution.
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